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RELATIONAL PREFERENCES
IN CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS
BROOK E. GOTBERG*

It is no secret that creditors hate so-called "preference" actions, which
permit a debtor to recover payments made to creditors on the eve of
bankruptcy for the benefit of the estate. Nominally, preference actions are
intended to equalize the extent to which each unsecured creditor must bear
the loss of a bankruptcy discharge, or to discourage creditors from rushing to
collect from the debtor in such a way that will push an insolvent debtor into
bankruptcy. But empirical evidence strongly suggests that, at least in chapter
11 reorganization proceedings, preference actions do not fulfill either of
these stated goals. Interviews with debtors, trade creditors, and attorneys
involved in small- and medium-sized chapter 11 bankruptcy cases establish
both that creditors are not deterred from collecting by preference actions, and
that preference actions are not applied equally in a system where debtors are
able to choose which preferential transfers to avoid and how much to accept
in settlement of preference actions. Instead, these interviews suggest an
alternative justification for preference law in chapter 11, one more consistent
with promoting a debtor's ability to exercise strategic leverage over its
creditors in an effort to reorganize. In this way, the law of preference
avoidance is actually one of preference perpetuation, and is exercised with
an eye towards preserving valuable relationships within bankruptcy
proceedings.
Introduction
In most bankruptcy proceedings, creditors correctly anticipate that the
debtor will prove unable to repay all its debts in full, requiring unsecured
creditors to write off most, if not all, of what they are owed. In common
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to those debtors, creditors, and attorneys who entertained my intrusive and occasionally naive
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Southworth ('19), for their tireless efforts searching court records and transcribing interviews.
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parlance, bankruptcy is synonymous with nonpayment of debt, and
unsecured creditors are usually the last to be paid pursuant to existing
schemes of priority.' Accordingly, the loss comes as no surprise. However,
creditors are frequently surprised to learn that in chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings the debtor can demand the return of payments it has made to
creditors in the ninety days prior to bankruptcy; these payments are generally
referred to as "preferential transfers," and the debtor can recover the
"preference" from the creditor.2
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a preferential transfer as one
made to or on behalf of a creditor for a pre-existing debt in the ninety days
before the bankruptcy filing, 3 so long as the transfer afforded the creditor
more than it would have received under a chapter 7 distribution. When a
creditor receives notice of a preference action, it must return the amount it
received during the preference period or present a defense establishing that
the transfer falls within one of the exceptions delineated in the statute.5 If the
creditor fails to present a defense, any claims it may have against the debtor's
estate will be disallowed,' and ajudgment may be entered against the creditor
in the amount of the avoided preference.
While common, preference actions are not well understood among the
creditor population, particularly those experiencing their first bankruptcy.

1. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §722 (2018).

2. After being sued to return fees paid, one creditor reflected, "Well, I don't know what
it's called . . . I certainly have no preference for it at all." See Telephone Interview with PC
(Sept. 7, 2017). Each interview cited or referenced in this Article has been stripped of
identifying information and is on file with the author. See discussion infra notes 107-215.
3. This ninety-day period is termed the "preference" period. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
4. Id. If the creditor is unsecured, and the bankruptcy payout in chapter 7 for unsecured
creditors would be less than one hundred cents on the dollar, this requirement is always met.
See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38

VAND.

L.

REV. 713, 736-37 (1985). Preference actions are also available under other sections of the
Code, but the ramifications of preference in consumer bankruptcies or in liquidations are not
discussed here.
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 550. These exceptions include transfers that constitute
substantially contemporaneous exchanges, payments in the ordinary course of business, the
granting of a purchase money security interest, and transfers that are followed by the giving
of new value to the debtor. See Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business
Bankruptcy: The Needfor DifferentRules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWAL. REv. 51, 67-77
(2014).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d).
7. See Erwin I. Katz et al., Types of Bankruptcy-Related Disputes, in ABI GUIDE TO
BANKRUPTCY MEDIATION 11 (1st ed. 2005) ("Preference actions seem particularly unfair:

creditors are often shocked to learn that they may have to repay money to a debtor for receiving
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According to the legislative history, preference actions are permitted for two
primary reasons: first, to promote equal distribution among creditors, and
second, to discourage creditors from rushing to collect from an insolvent
debtor, thereby pushing the debtor into bankruptcy.8 Although both of these
goals would nominally benefit unsecured creditors by helping to avoid
unnecessary bankruptcies and by ensuring equal treatment among creditors
within bankruptcy, preference actions remain a source of considerable vitriol
among the creditor community. 9 Certainly, much of this distaste can be
explained by the psychological concept of loss aversion. 0 However, an
informed understanding of how preference actions are used in practice

payment that was lawful at the time but has become actionable upon the filing of
bankruptcy."); see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
8. See H. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977) ("The purpose of the preference section is
two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a
short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to
dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.. .. Second, and more important, the
preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors of the debtor."); S.REP.No. 95-989, at 98 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5874 (noting the general policy of preference law is deterring "unusual action" by the
debtor or creditors); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 202 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT
ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS] (listing "three distinct goals" for preference in the Bankruptcy Act of
1898) ("First, it lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for advantage; second,
it promotes equality; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise loans in order to
obtain a preferential payment or security."); Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an
Irresolute Endorsementfor Scientific Rationalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 1439, 1447, 1479; Robert Weisberg, CommercialMorality, the Merchant
Character, andthe History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 3 (1986); Richard
B. Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 184
(1979).
9. See Charles J. Tabb, The Brave New World of Bankruptcy Preferences, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 425, 439 (2005) ("[U]nless one's ox got gored more than average,
economic rationality might argue for accepting a pro-trustee venue system. That economic
argument, though, is utterly unpersuasive to trade creditors-a truth to which I personally can
attest as Reporter for the ABI Preference Study, where I tried in vain to make that argument
to the trade creditor representatives."); David Lander, A Snapshot ofRecentAvoidance Cases,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb. 2004, 2004 NO. 2 NRTN-BLA 2 (Westlaw) (suggesting
that defendants in preference actions are often dubious that the net total of preference
recoveries significantly increases distribution to unsecured creditors).
10. Loosely defined, loss aversion refers to the phenomenon that the pain of loss is felt
more keenly than the benefit of gain. See Sabrina M. Tom, Craig R. Fox, Christopher Trepel
& Russell A Poldrack, The Neural Basis of Loss Aversion in Decision-Making Under Risk,
SCIENCE, Jan. 2007, at 515, 515.
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demonstrates that the distaste may also be justified by the simple fact that
preferences are unequally enforced in chapter 11.
Chapter 11 reorganization is complex, unlike the relatively straightforward liquidation proceedings available in chapter 7. Consequently, there
is more room for unequal treatment among creditors. Under chapter 7, the
pro rata distribution of assets among similarly situated creditors" is overseen
by an appointed trustee who has been vetted by the U.S. Trustee's Office for
potential conflicts of interest.' 2 In chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor, acting
as a debtor-in-possession (DIP), proposes a plan to repay creditors.' 3 This
plan can and often does depart from the formulaic distribution set forth in
chapter 7. The chapter 11 structure has been described as "a deal within a
lawsuit": 4 the DIP must negotiate with creditors in order to obtain sufficient
votes for a plan of reorganization that will also satisfy the court." The
creditors are undeniably invested in the debtor's survival, but their interests
may also be fundamentally in conflict with those of the debtor and other
effected parties. Litigation is expected and common,' 6 reflecting both the
creditors' interests in forcing the debtor to provide them more favorable
payment terms and the debtor's interest in forcing creditors to be satisfied
with less.
Beyond the need for creditor support for the plan, a DIP, unlike a chapter
7 trustee, will also be concerned with the ongoing viability of the company.
Viability will be influenced by the willingness of trade partners to continue
doing business with a debtor. When trade partners are owed money in the
bankruptcy, they are referred to as trade creditors. Some trade creditors may
prove essential to the debtor's ongoing viability, and will accordingly
warrant different treatment than other, less essential creditors.
Consider the following generic example. Debtor Daniels runs a molded
fiber company, which uses recycled paper pulp to manufacture packaging
material. In order to run his day-to-day operations, he requires working
capital, which is provided by his lender, Green Bank. Green Bank holds a
security interest in Daniels' inventory and equipment. By virtue of its

11. See 11U.S.C. §726(b) (2018).

12. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 701; U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR

CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 2-7 (2012), https://wwwjustice.gov/ust/file/handbookfor

chapter

7_trustees.pdf/download.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2018).
14. Credit to Judge Dennis Dow, Western District of Missouri.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
16. For an explanation of contested matters in bankruptcy, see Paul P. Daley & George
W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy CourtJurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 383, 409 (2005).
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security interest, Green Bank is entitled either to payment in full or to
possession of its collateral. This right is preserved in bankruptcy.' 7
Accordingly, Daniels must pay Green Bank or be shut down. In addition,
Daniels owes money to Owen's Ovens pursuant to a maintenance and parts
agreement. Owen's Ovens is the only local company with the ability to
maintain the ovens Daniels needs to manufacture his products. Daniels also
owes money to Patty's Paper Pulp, which provides him with the raw
materials he needs for his packaging material. However, unlike the oven
maintenance, paper pulp is available from a variety of local vendors. In
bankruptcy, Daniels will be most concerned about obtaining Green Bank's
cooperation, but also highly aware of his need to mollify Owen's Ovens, even
if doing so is at the expense of Patty's Paper Pulp, with whom he has a more
expendable business relationship.
Consequently, Patty is likely to be treated differently in the bankruptcy
than Owen, even though both are unsecured creditors, nominally subject to a
pro rata distribution. Empirical evidence pulled from interviews with parties
who have been involved in chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings suggests that
this unequal treatment extends to preference actions; the creditors who are
sued for a preference by a DIP tend to be those who are less important to the
debtor or less essential to the debtor's reorganization. 8 Conversely, a debtor
generally avoids filing lawsuits against parties with whom it intends to
preserve a long-term relationship.
Notions of equality simply do not come into play when a DIP is fighting
for its survival. A DIP is not technically required to bring an available
preference action, although the debtor's flexibility in this regard is highly
debated.1 9 The applicable language in § 547 indicates that the DIP "may"
bring the preference action, signifying a permissive standard.20 Some have
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). For a discussion regarding the extent of a secured creditor's
rights in bankruptcy, see Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing
and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018) (arguing for a distinction
between claims to priority and claims to residual value); Christopher W. Frost, Secured Credit
and Effective Entity Priority, 51 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that secured
creditors can effectively establish priority over the entity).
18. See discussion infra notes 190-93.
19. See discussion infra notes 194-98.
20. The language of section 547 also applies to a chapter 7 trustee. However, unlike a
DIP in chapter 11, a chapter 7 trustee is unlikely to refrain from pursuing a preference action
unless doing so would be a losing strategy pursuant to a cost benefit analysis. Chapter 7
trustees are totally unconcerned with the preservation of ongoing business relationships in
light of liquidation, and are compensated pursuant to the amount they bring into the estate.
See 11 U.S.C. § 326; Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) ("Now, Chapter 7 is
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argued that the DIP's fiduciary duty to the estate would require bringing any
such existing claim, while others have argued that the language of the statute
is deliberate, and the DIP can use its discretion in determining when a
preference action would be detrimental to the chances of reorganization. 2
The DIP's fiduciary duty to maximize the estate certainly suggests a duty
to maximize preference recoveries pursuant to a cost-benefit analysis,
although there is no clear direction on how costs and benefits should be
measured. 2 2 Without the cooperation of certain preferred creditors, it is
possible that the long-term health of the company will suffer and the
repayment of creditors will be diminished, accordingly it may be better for
the debtor to forgo recovery, or to offer a generous settlement agreement. 23
The debtor may also wish to settle rather than pursue a claim that appears
more difficult, but not impossible, to prove. Indeed, settlement of preference
claims is the rule, rather than the exception,24 but there appears to be
relatively little oversight of preference settlements. Settlement amounts are
not typically reported in the case docket, and a DIP need not commit itself to

completely different because the trustees will just immediately do it. They'll do it for a $150
preference, they'll send the letter."); Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) ("I would
say in my experience the trade creditors are being pursued by the Chapter 7 trustee, the
liquidating trust trustee coming out of the bankruptcy so that there isn't an ongoing Chapter
11 debtor that needs the relationship . . . ."); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017)
("When things meltdown, preferences are always on the table .. [in] a 7[] or a liquidating
11.").
21. See discussion infra notes 190-96. Requiring a DIP to bring a preference action any
time it existed would result in a significantly different dynamic in chapter 11. Whether or not
it would be advisable to do so in order to further the equality purposes of preferences is an
intriguing issue not examined in this paper. I have elsewhere argued that, in chapter 7,
preference liability should be automatic and absolute, without exceptions. Gotberg, supra note
5, at 90.
22. This fiduciary duty arises as a matter of law. See In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc.,
200 F.3d 170, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) ("United Healthcare, as a debtor-in-possession, is
a fiduciary for its estate and for its creditors."); In re J.T.R. Corp., 958 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir.
1992) ("The debtor-in-possession does not act in his own interests, but rather in the interests
of the creditors."); Dunes Hotel Assocs. v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492, 506 (D.S.C. 2000) ("A
trustee or debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary that should act in the interests of the creditors,
not in its own interests."); In re Brent Expls., Inc., 31 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1983) ("[A]t the filing of the bankruptcy petition the debtor becomes a new entity, the debtorin-possession with its own rights and duties. . . . This second entity has a fiduciary duty to
the estate.").
23. See Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (noting the ability of a DIP to reach
a favorable settlement with important creditors when forced to bring such an action under
pressure from the court or other creditors).
24. See discussion infra notes 230-32.
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pursue preference claims in the plan documents provided to creditors.25
Following plan confirmation, a DIP is not required to bring available
preference actions, which may be settled or even abandoned. 26 Accordingly,
a
broad
reading
of
the
"may"
clause
in
§ 547, combined with a great deal of flexibility in establishing settlement
amounts, allows a DIP to favor some creditors over others using preference
actions.
This Article makes the case that, by virtue of a debtor's flexibility to
pursue actions against some creditors but not others, preference avoidance
actions in chapter 11 have come to promote policy goals wholly divorced
from those asserted by Congress in the legislative history. Preference law in
chapter 11 should be understood as a strategic tool for chapter 11 debtors to
wield in negotiations with creditors, and not as an effort to equalize
repayment among creditors or to deter pre-bankruptcy collection efforts. 27
This theory is grounded primarily in data gathered from interviews with trade
creditors, debtors, and bankruptcy attorneys involved in recently confirmed
chapter 11 reorganizations. The principal benefit of personal interviews is
that they can provide a clarity and richness to the discussion that is difficult
to draw from other research devices, and they may reveal the motivations,
intentions, or beliefs of the actors involved.28 While findings from a limited
set of interviews cannot support definitive statements regarding the world,29
25. See discussion infra note 195 and accompanying text.
26. See Telephone Interview withDA (Sept. 8, 2017) ("In a chapter 11, where the debtor
proposes a plan and it gets confirmed and old management becomes new management and
equity goes away, and unsecured creditors become equity, there really is no major push on
preferences."); Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) ("[I]f you're a debtor and you
have an ongoing business and you don't have the watchful eye of the creditor's comnmittee or
you're not constantly in front of the judge and you're kind of done with your case, your need
at that point in time to file a preference action goes down precipitously."); Telephone
Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) ("So, a lot of times, people wait until after the plan is
confirmed and then sometimes they'll pursue those actions and sometimes not.").
27. See discussion infra note 208.
28. See Sergio Puig, Does BureaucraticInertiaMatter
in TreatyBargaining?Or, Toward
a Greater Use of QualitativeData in EmpiricalLegal Inquiries, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L.

317, 320 (2013) ("Qualitative empirical research is as valuable as quantitative research, and
provides possibilities for giving rich context to legal behavior."). Furthermore, the nature of
preference settlements makes quantitative analysis inherently difficult. As most preference
actions are settled prior to even a motion for summary judgment, the data on settlements and
settlement negotiations is not easy to gather. See Telephone Interview withDA (Sept. 8, 2017)
("When it does come down and we have clients that do get sued for preference? They settle.").
29. See Ellie Fossey, Carol Harvey, Fiona McDermott & Larry Davidson, Understanding
and Evaluating Qualitative Research, 36 AUSTL. & N. Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 717, 730 (2002);
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these findings nevertheless provide valuable insight into how preferences
function, and may point to further avenues of research.3 0
In a previous article, I reported that all creditors and attorneys interviewed
in this study indicated that creditors would prefer to collect past due
payments from the debtor when given the opportunity, and that attorneys
would recommend doing so.31 Although collection could provoke a
preference action later on, interviewees noted that the expected result of
preference claims was settlement with the debtor for substantially less than
the preference amount.3 2 This finding was consistent with broader theories
on deterrence, 33 and demonstrated that preference law as written fails to
discourage collection behavior because preference action "punishments" are
both unlikely to be enforced and substantially less costly than the benefit of
engaging in a collection action against the debtor.3 4 In other words, all
rational creditors would accept payments from the debtor in the ninety days
before bankruptcy even if they knew that such a preference could be avoided
in bankruptcy, and even if they suspected a bankruptcy filing was likely.
Here, I show that creditors in a long-term business relationship with a
debtor may be willing to overlook a short-term financial loss associated with
bankruptcy discharge in favor of preserving the long-term relationship;
however, when a trade creditor is faced with the perception that the debtor
deliberately "used" the creditor or abused the creditor's trust, creditors may
instead choose to abandon the relationship.35 Being sued for a preference is
widely perceived as such an act of betrayal, and both debtors and their
attorneys respond accordingly.36 The evidence suggests that because
preference litigation can severely undermine a trade creditor's willingness to
continue a relationship with the debtor, preference litigation is limited to
cases where the ongoing relationship is not a matter of concern. 3 7
The result is that a DIP only brings preference actions against creditors
that are less preferred. In this study, actions to avoid preferential transfers
Kelly J. Asmussen & John W. Creswell, Campus Response to a Student Gunman, J. HIGHER
EDUC., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 575, 588.
30. See Fossey, supra note 30, at 730; THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
8 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 2011).
31. Brook E. Gotberg, Optimal Deterrence and the Preference Gap, 2018 BYU L. REv.
559, 611-12.
32. Id. at 588.
33. Id. at 565-72.
34. Id. at 621-22.
35. See discussion infra notes 133-52.
36. See discussion infra notes 169-78.
37. See discussion infra note 190.
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were not intended to bring the targeted creditor back into parity with others.
Instead, study participants reported using preference actions to encourage
concessions from particular creditors,38 to disallow the creditors' claims,3 9 to
exclude uncooperative creditors from voting on the plan of reorganization, 4 0
and to encourage the settlement or reduction of claims from these creditors.'
Preference law was used as another method to extract concessions from
creditors, especially those with whom the debtor did not seek an ongoing
business relationship. These findings lead to the conclusion that preference
law in chapter 11 requires a new theory of justification, one informed by
relational concerns bound up in business dealings.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part One provides a brief explanation of
the historical legislative rationale for preference actions in bankruptcy,
academic criticism of these purported justifications, and an explanation of
my prior work on the topic. Part Two introduces the sample group evaluated
in this study-namely, trade creditors in small- and medium-sized chapter 11
bankruptcy reorganizations-and explains why they were particularly
selected for evaluation. Part Three reports on study findings regarding how
trade creditors viewed their business relationships with a debtor in cases of
bankruptcy. Part Four discusses how preference actions impacted business
relationships between trade creditors and debtors and explains how these
results influenced decisions about when and where to bring preference
actions. Part Five places these findings in the context of prior theoretical
work regarding business relationships and suggests that preference actions
may be better understood as a tool to manage business relationships in
bankruptcy than as a method to ensure equality of distribution.
I. PreferenceLegislative History
Like much of modem American bankruptcy law, the idea of avoiding
preferential transfers came from English laws on bankruptcy and insolvency,
which were then adopted and incorporated into American jurisprudence.
Historically, preference law closely resembled the law of fraudulent
38. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) ("Now, sometimes a debtor will
use the threat of preference litigation to induce the creditor to do something.").
39. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017).
40. See Telephone Interview withDA (May 19, 2017) ("If they filed a proof of claim for
ten million dollars but if you object and file a preference, then all of a sudden, it's not an
allowed claim, they can't vote or receive anything unless they pay the preference back and it
changes the negotiating posture with the creditor.").
41. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) ("And so, they filed this preference
action just to put pressure on us to reduce our claim.").
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conveyance. 4 2 It required a finding of intent as part of establishing liabilityeither the debtor's intent to favor one creditor over another 43 or the creditor's
knowledge that such a transfer would be preferential. 4 The decision to
move away from the intent requirement was informed by the 1973 Report of
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which
indicated that the intent requirement was "the most troublesome feature" of
current preference provisions, leading to much litigation, and that "intention
should be irrelevant."4 5
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, preference law has
moved away from analyzing the motivations of either the debtor or the
creditor. Instead, it has purported to encourage equality among creditors by
ensuring that a creditor that had the good fortune to be paid just before the
bankruptcy filing is treated no differently than a creditor that was not paid in
the days before bankruptcy. 6 Preference law as written is to be enforced
regardless of the creditor's intention. 7 Instead, the legislative history

42. See Countryman, supra note 4, at 716-18; John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy,
Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 250 (1981);
Ponoroff, supra note 8, at 1448 n.21; Weisberg, supra note 8, at 4.
43. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 492 (repealed 1843) (declaring

void and fraudulent all transfers of property made in contemplation of bankruptcy and for the
purpose of giving a preference); Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534
(repealed 1978) (declaring void and avoidable transfers made in contemplation of insolvency
with a view to give a preference, and the existence of such transfers made outside the usual
and ordinary course of business prima facie evidence of fraud).
44. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978)
(declaring a preference avoidable only if the person receiving the transfer "shall have had
reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference").
45. COMMissioN REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 8, at 203-04 ("That [intent]
requirement, more than any other, has rendered ineffective the preference section of the
present Act.").
46. See Lissa Lanikin Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences:
The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DuKE L.J. 78, 115 ("After Congress

removed the 'reasonable cause to believe' requirement in 1978, the main goal of the preference
provision was to preserve equality of distribution; the prevention of unusual pressure or action
by the creditor became only an incidental objective."); Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethinking
Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REv. 981, 990 (1992) (submitting that it should be irrelevant whether

preferred creditors knowingly obtained payment from a debtor likely to seek bankruptcy relief
or not).
47. See BankruptcyActRevision: Hearingson H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary(pt. 2), 94th Cong.

1855 (1976) ("Logically and theoretically, the knowledge of the recipient of the preference
has nothing to do with equality of distribution. Equality is determined by the fact that all
creditors are being treated reasonably alike. So, if two creditors received a payment .. . and
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indicates that the underlying motivation is one of fairness;48 because it is
almost universally established that not all creditors will be paid in full,
payment should at least be equal among creditors holding similar legal
rights. 4 9 Although commentators disagree on the appropriate focus of
preference law, they largely agree that the original motivation for
establishing preference liability was to establish equality among creditors."
In England, preference liability still hinges on a showing that the debtor
intended to favor one creditor over another, and a creditor may defend against
preference liability by demonstrating that payment was prompted by the
creditor exercising real commercial influence over the debtor, such as by

one had knowledge and one did not of the insolvency of the debtor, that has really no relevancy
to equality of treatment.").
48. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6297 ("Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all
creditors are treated equally."); H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 177-78, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6138 ("[T]he preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of
equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor."); CoMMIssION REPORT ON
BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 8, at 202 (listing three distinct goals for preference in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898) ("First, it lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for
advantage; second, it promotes equality; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise
loans in order to obtain a preferential payment or security.").
49. There is some departure from this principle embedded in the Bankruptcy Code itself,
insofar as certain creditors are afforded repayment ahead of others by virtue of their priority
status, which is delineated in 11 U.S.C. § 507. For example, domestic support obligations
receive first priority in the order of repayment, such that other claims will not receive any
repayment until those debts are satisfied. See id. § 507(a)(1)(A). In addition, employee wages
up to $12,850 receive priority over most other unsecured debts and must be satisfied before
those debts are paid. See id. § 507(a)(4).
50. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 47, at 115 (noting that, after 1978, "the main goal of
preference provision was to preserve equality of distribution," with deterrence "only an
incidental objective"); Countryman, supra note 4, at 748 ("The function of the preference
concept is to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of distribution.");
McCoid, supra note 43, at 260 ("Preference law tries to impose equality on prebankruptcy
behavior so that that behavior will not make the principle of equality in bankruptcy distribution
meaningless."); Edward S. Margolis, Advantage to Creditor: Understanding Preference
Actions and Available Defenses, 93 ILL. B.J. 590, 590-91 (2005) ("The power to avoid
preferences promotes the primary bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors by insuring that all creditors of the same class receive the same pro rata share of the
debtor's estate."); Rafael I. Pardo, On Proofof PreferentialEffect, 55 ALA. L. REv. 281, 283
(2004); Weisberg, supra note 8, at 4 ("Bankruptcy law empowers the trustee and the court to
enforce ratable distribution as a matter of public power; preference law implies that the debtor
and creditor have a private duty to save the bankruptcy process from becoming moot before it
has a chance to start.").
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bringing or threatening a lawsuit."' In the United States, however, the
intentions of both debtor and creditor are irrelevant;5 2 it is only the effect of
the transfer that matters. Accordingly, a creditor who accepts a payment with
no knowledge of the debtor's insolvency may be found liable for a
preference, even absent any evidence that the debtor intended to prefer the
creditor over others.
Some have argued that, in addition to its function as an equalizer among
unsecured creditors, preference law also serves as a deterrent against creditor
efforts to sidestep inclusion in the pro rata distribution afforded under the
bankruptcy system. However, the actual deterrent effect of preference law is
highly suspect.53 The purported deterrent force of preference law rests on
some flawed assumptions that simply are not reflected in real-world
experience. As explained by Lawrence Ponoroff, the belief appears to be that:
without a preference law, creditors that supposedly might
otherwise have been inclined to work with the debtor will feel
obliged to swoop in to claim their share of the available spoils as
soon [sic] they learn that the debtor has come upon financiallytroubled waters. Thus, the debtor's slide into bankruptcy will
become inevitable. But, with the existence of preference liability,
the reasoning goes, any such efforts will be futile, so that the
creditors will say, "shucks, no point if I'm just going to have to
give it back."5 4
In my research, creditors usually do not make such a pre-calculation,
because they are unaware of preference law or because they consider
preference litigation to be a remote possibility. Even when creditors do
anticipate preference liability, they typically use cost/benefit analysis to
determine that they will be better off collecting now, risking the possibility
of repaying some part of what they collected later." This is not to say that
51. See Adrian Walters, Preferences, in

VULNERABLE TRANSACTIONS IN CORPORATE

INSOLVENCY 123 (John Armour & Howard Bennett eds., 2003).

52. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 6138

(discussing the reasons for doing away with the requirement that a creditor be aware of the
debtor's insolvency).
53.

Gotberg, supra note 31, at 613; Tabb, supra note 47, at 990 ("Deterrence is effective,

however, only against parties who are aware of the debtor's financial distress and who
therefore see the collective proceeding coming. Innocent parties by definition will not be
deterred; the state of the preference law will have no impact on their behavior.").
54. Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant PassengersAboard the
Flightfrom Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 344 (2016).
55. See Gotberg, supra note 31, at 611-12.
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preference law does not affect creditor behavior, but it does not do so in ways
that are particularly beneficial to the debtor.5 ' Further, creditors are
consistently advised by their attorneys to take preferential payments when
they are offered.5 ' Accordingly, it is unclear what deterrent effect preference
laws have. This leaves the enforcement of equality principles as the primary
remaining goal identified in the legislative history. As explained below,
chapter 11 preference avoidance actions serve neither of the rationales given
in the legislative history, but instead promote an entirely different policy
goal. Put simply, in chapter 11 the availability of preference avoidance
actions increases a debtor's leverage over creditors.
II. Trade Creditors and Bankruptcy Proceedings
A. Introducing Trade Creditors
Technically, any creditor who has received a transfer from the debtor in
the ninety-day preference period may be subject to a preference action.
However, liable parties are most frequently unsecured creditors, for the
simple reason that preference actions are only available when the targeted
transfer allows the creditor to receive more than it would have had the
transfer not been made and property distributed pursuant to chapter 7
principles.5 9 Secured creditors are generally immune from preference
liability, because they are paid in full up to the amount of their collateral,
even in bankruptcy proceedings.o In contrast, unsecured creditors rarely
receive 100% of their claims in bankruptcy, such that any transfer in the
preference period will serve to improve their position under preference
laws. 6 1 The population of unsecured creditors in small- and medium-sized
chapter 11 cases is largely made of up of so-called trade creditors. 6 2

56. See Ponoroff, supra note 55, at 345 ("Of course, overlooked in this simplistic and
rosy picture of creditor behavior is the fact that the existence of a preference law might just as
easily motivate a creditor, otherwise inclined to work with the debtor, to race to the courthouse
and grab the debtor's remaining assets with the hope not only of getting ahead of its fellow
creditors, but also of getting ahead of the ninety-day clock.").
57. See Gotberg, supra note 31, at 610-11.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2018).
59. See id. § 547(b)(5).
60. See id. § 506(a).
61. See Countryman, supra note 4, at 736-37.
62. Although they also appear in large chapter 11 cases, trade creditors are treated
differently depending on the size of the case. See Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The
Dynamics ofLarge and Small Chapter]] Cases:An EmpiricalStudy (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin.,
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Although the term "trade creditor" does not appear in the Bankruptcy
Code and is not subject to a universal definition, it is generally understood to
embody those unsecured creditors who have been engaged in business
transactions with the debtor on the basis of short-term credit. 63 Trade
creditors may or may not have signed a formal contract with the debtor, and
they may have short- or long-term relationships with the debtor. The
exchanges between trade creditors and debtors are presumptively unsecured,
because the parties tend to be engaged in transactions in which the grant of a
security interest would be impractical. This is perhaps due to the small size
or informal nature of the transactions.64 However, some trade creditors may
be able to obtain liens (such as mechanics' liens) or other possessory interests
in the debtor's assets. 5
Trade creditors are frequently overlooked in discussions of bankruptcy
policy, perhaps because their importance is overshadowed by the influence
of other parties, such as a post-petition financier 66 or a pre-petition secured
creditor with an interest in essential collateral.6' Although unsecured trade
creditors do not have an interest in collateral held by the debtor, they
nevertheless control an asset in which the debtor is invested-the future
goods and services of the creditor, to which the debtor has often become
accustomed and which may be vital to the smooth operation of the debtor's
business. In this regard, some trade creditors may be more essential than

&

Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), https://perma.cc/EUW8-GDXD ("Small businesses in
Chapter 11 (and the vast majority are small) are qualitatively different from larger ones.").
63. See DON B. BRADLEY, III & MICHAEL J. RUBACH, TRADE CREDIT AND SMALL
BUSINESSES: A CASE OF BUSINESS FAILURES 1 (2002), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.508.7600&rep=repl&type=pdf.
64. For other insights on how and why trade credit is used, see Mariassunta Giannetti et
al., What You Sell Is What You Lend?: Explaining Trade Credit Contracts,24 REV. FIN. STUD.
1261, 1262 (2008).
65. See Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism About Reorganization:Explaining the Failure
of Chapter ]] Theory, 106 DICK. L. REv. 267, 295 (2001).
66. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) ("[Y]ou can't go into bankruptcy
without having cash flow or ... a financing friend.").
67. See Charles J. Tabb, CreditBidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 1],
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 142 ("Today, senior secured debt rules."). The importance of a
secured creditor is due in large part to the ability of such a creditor to influence the bankruptcy
case by virtue of the leverage it holds on the debtor's collateral. See Stuart C. Gilson
Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical
Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1011-12 (1994) (reporting on a study analyzing 381
publicly held firms that experience severe stock price declines, which found a 52% likelihood
of management turnover, often accredited to the pressure of banks, with more senior and
secured claims exercising a greater weight of influence).
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others, depending on the importance of the trade creditor's business to the
function of the debtor's, the availability of alternatives, and other similar
factors. In the example given above," Owen's Ovens provides a specialized
service and is the only provider of molded fiber ovens in Debtor Daniels'
area. On the other hand, Patty's Paper Pulp is a more generic product for
which alternatives and additional vendors are readily available. In some
cases, creditors and debtors may become mutually reliant on each other by
virtue of co-specialization, each having adjusted their business to the use of
the other's product.6 9 Generally speaking, the more specialized, unique, or
difficult it is to obtain a good or service, and the more essential it is to the
debtor's operations, the more important it is to maintain good relations with
the provider of that good or service and to secure his or her cooperation in
the bankruptcy proceedings.70
B. Trade Creditors'Influencein Bankruptcy Proceedings
If trade creditors respond to a bankruptcy filing by refusing to do business
with the debtor in the future, then reorganization is likely to be impossible;
without the goods and services necessary to run the business, the debtor will
simply be unable to continue operations. Absent a pre-existing contractual
relationship,7i the Bankruptcy Code contains no obligation that creditors
continue to do business with a debtor after a bankruptcy filing, even on a cash
basis. 7 2 Moreover, there is no obligation that a creditor provide post-petition

68. See discussionsupra notes 18-19.
69. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, PrinciplesofRelationalContracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1101 (1981) ("The essence of the problem is that, even where perfectly

substitutable trading parties are initially available in a competitive market, the increasing
specialization of the parties vis-a-vis each other produces a species of bilateral monopoly.").
70. See Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (noting that, prior to filing,

debtor's counsel must consult with the client regarding what the vendor reaction is likely to
be, and that such reaction varies depending on how unique or replaceable the vendor's goods
are).

71. Creditors who breach a contract with the debtor will be liable for damages associated
with breach. Likewise, a debtor may be liable if it breaches a contract with a creditor; however,
the breach will be treated as a pre-bankruptcy obligation and paid out pursuant to the chapter
11 plan. This usually means that the unsecured debt incurred by the breach will be significantly
reduced, as it will be paid out on a pro rata basis with all other unsecured debt. See generally
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).
72. But see id. § 525 (establishing protections against discriminatory treatment by
governmental units or private employers solely because a debtor filed for bankruptcy).
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trade credit to a debtor, which may be sorely needed in light of cash
constraints.7
Debtors in chapter 11 frequently have a strong incentive to placate trade
creditors in order to ensure ongoing business relationships and a positive vote
on the chapter 11 Plan. Locating a replacement source of goods and services,
even if it can be done, will almost always require time and energy on the part
of the debtor, and the terms offered post-bankruptcy are rarely more
favorable than the terms obtained pre-bankruptcy.1 4 In addition, although
individual trade creditors typically lack the voting power of secured
creditors, 7 ' as a group they can influence the outcome of the case by choosing

to support or reject a DIP's plan of reorganization.7 1
As with any other group of creditors, the DIP depends on the cooperation
of trade creditors to vote in favor of a bankruptcy plan in order to ensure
confirmation by the court. In situations where the DIP faces an
uncooperative secured creditor, votes from trade creditors may be
particularly vital in order to ensure a "cramdown" plan.7 1 In the event that a
73. See Robert I. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled
Organizational Image and Its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 405, 417 (1987)

("[I]ndividuals or organizations that participate in relationships with bankrupt firms can often
negotiate more favorable terms of exchange than previously existed; the fact of Chapter 11
increases their bargaining power."); Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017) ("[I]t's

very difficult for any business to stay in business if they can't get at least 30-day credit, 30 to
60."); discussion infra note 129.
74. See Lubben, supra note 65, at 296 ("[I]t is hard to envision any system of

reorganization functioning without a means to ensure the cooperation of at least a core group
of the debtor's suppliers.").
75. Any individual secured creditor has the power to make a Plan nonconsensual by
voting against it, because consensual plans require the approval of all classes, and secured
creditors are typically a class in and of themselves. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018); Jack
Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter ]] Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L.

REV. 1495, 1500 (1992) ("The general rule ... is that each secured claim is almost always
placed in its own separate class because each has different rights regarding collateral and
priority.").

76. Trade creditors can be, and typically are, lumped into a single class. See 11 U.S.C. §
1122. A class is considered to have accepted the plan of reorganization if at least two-thirds
of the class, measured by the combined amount of their claims, and more than one-half of the
number of creditors have accepted the plan. Id. § 1126(c).
77. See id. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring that each impaired class of claims has accepted the
plan).
78. See id. § 1129(b). Although the term "cramdown" does not appear in the Code, it is
common parlance for the alternative path to plan confirmation that involves the consent of
only one class of creditors. A cramdown plan involves additional oversight by the court and
adherence to additional requirements. These requirements include obtaining a court
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secured creditor is undersecured and bifurcates its claim into secured and
unsecured classes,7 9 trade creditor support may be even more vital in order
to outweigh the undersecured creditor's veto, especially if there is only one
class of unsecured creditors.so The influence that any individual trade creditor
will have on the acceptance of the plan will depend largely on how creditors
are classified and the size of the classes, in addition to the size of the
individual creditor's claim.
Beyond the vote, trade creditors may have an impact on the chapter 11
case by virtue of being part of a creditor's committee, which may be formed
by the United States trustee to oversee the proceedings and raise issues with
the court as needed."' Such a committee is typically formed by the holders of
the largest unsecured claims against the debtor,8 2 which frequently will
include some number of trade creditors. The committee is entitled to appoint
an attorney or another professional representative (such as an accountant) to
oversee its interests and investigate the DIP.83 The representative will be
paid, not by the trade creditors directly, but rather from bankruptcy estate

determination that the plan does not discriminate unfairly, but is instead fair and equitable
with respect to each class of claims or interests impaired under the plan. Perhaps the most
difficult of these requirements is that the plan "be fair and equitable," which is defined in the
Code as requiring all junior interest holders to forfeit their interests in the debtor unless and
until more senior interest holders have been satisfied in full. See id. § 1129(b)(2). This
"absolute priority" rule can mean that a debtor's principals must sacrifice their equity in order
to confirm a plan, which is often a tenuous result, especially for closely-held organizations.
See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, TE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1182-83 (4th ed. 2016). A potential
escape hatch for equity holders is the "new value corollary" to the absolute priority rule, which
could allow former equity holders to repurchase their equity by virtue of a fresh infusion of
value through the chapter 11 plan. Although the contribution of new value in exchange for old
equity is not explicitly permitted in the Bankruptcy Code, it has been implicitly recognized by
the Supreme Court in Bank ofAmerica NationalTrust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North Lasalle
Street Partnership,526 U.S. 434, 449 (1999).
79. An undersecured creditor may-but is not required to-avoid bifurcation by electing
to treat the entire undersecured claim as fully secured. In doing so, the creditor forfeits the
right to the present value of its claim and accepts a nominal dollar amount (usually paid out
over time) instead. This is commonly called the "§1111(b) election." See 11 U.S.C. §
Ill 1(b)(2).
80. There is some uncertainty in the law over whether a debtor can classify the unsecured
portion of a secured creditor's claim separately in order to establish a consenting class in a
cramdown situation. See Linda J. Rusch, Gerrymanderingthe ClassificationIssue in Chapter
Eleven Reorganizations, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 163, 164 (1992).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
82. See id. § 1102(b).
83. See id. § 1103(a), (c).
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assets as an administrative expense. 4 The appointment of such a committee
thus imposes an additional level of pressure on the DIP to acknowledge
concerns held by the unsecured creditors represented by the creditors'
committee, both because the committee has the ability to demand
information from the DIP and to file motions with the bankruptcy court, and
because work performed by the committee will be at the expense of the
debtor's estate. A cooperative committee can facilitate the reorganization
process; an uncooperative committee can introduce significant time delays
and added expense to the process."
Finally, the cooperation of trade creditors can be a meaningful signal to
other important players about the viability of the debtor over the long term.
Potential financiers of the debtor may look to the willingness of trade
creditors to extend short-term credit to the debtor in evaluating whether they
are willing to invest for longer periods of time." Courts may look to the
expressed willingness of trade creditors to continue in business with the
debtor as a signal that a plan of reorganization is feasible. 7 Ultimately, trade
creditors have a significant role to play in the success of a debtor's
reorganization that should not be overlooked or understated.

84. See id. § 503(b)(4).

85. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) ("[A] lot of the debtors consider it
just more cost and interference. But, I think a sophisticated debtor attorney doesn't really mind
a committee of truly unsecured trade creditors because at the end of the day you want that
class to accept. And, that can be your vehicle to try to get the acceptance."); Telephone
Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) ("You want them to work with you, because Chapter 11
is a collaborative process . . . . Most cases that I've experienced where you have a lot of

creditor animosity will not be successful because the debtor will spend too much time and
money fighting as opposed to focusing on restructuring. So, without a collaborative effort the
successful Chapter 11 process I think is hindered substantially.").
86. See Lubben, supra note 65, at 295.
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (requiring that the court find that "[c]onfirmation of [a]

chapter 11 plan is not likely to be followed by [a] liquidation, or [a] need for further financial
reorganization").
88. See Lubben, supranote 65, at 294 ("The trade creditor ... is one of the most neglected
and misunderstood parties in Chapter 11 theory."). That said, it is a common perception among
attorneys that, of the three groups, trade creditors are typically the most insignificant in a
bankruptcy case. See Telephone Interview withDA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with

DA (June 6, 2017) ("[R]ealistically, trade creditors, except for the ones that you have to have,
the critical vendors, they have no leverage. You just ignore them."); Telephone Interview with
CA (June 21, 2017) ("[M]y experience is that unless they're on a committee then you don't

really care much from trade.").
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C. Trade Creditorsas a Study Group
I decided to focus my research on preference actions against trade
creditors in the bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized companies for both
practical and substantive reasons. On the practical side, I was concerned that
it would prove difficult to arrange interviews with individuals at larger
institutions who would be both willing to speak with me and able to provide
meaningful insight regarding how company decisionmakers reacted to a
bankruptcy filing or a preference lawsuit. Further, I assumed that small- and
medium-sized companies were more likely to be affected by an individual
bankruptcy filing or preference lawsuit, and would therefore be a more likely
source for feedback.89 Substantively, it made more sense to focus on the use
of preference actions in small- and medium-sized cases because they
represent the bulk of chapter 11 filings; although they are processed in the
same chapter as mega-cases, they function very differently in practice.90
Similarly, I wanted to focus on the impact of preference actions on parties
most likely to be targeted by such actions, which in these smaller cases were
unsecured trade creditors. Although there are interesting insights to be
gleaned from studies of other types of creditors in chapter 1 1,91 and I freely
acknowledge that such insights are not included in these results,
considerations of scope made it necessary to limit my findings to this group.
I also consciously limited my study to chapter 11 cases in which a plan of
reorganization had been successfully confirmed. Many filed chapter 11 cases
do not result in a confirmed plan, and are instead dismissed or converted to a
chapter 7 case, in which liquidation is the only possible outcome. 92

&

89. See Michael J. Peel, Nicholas Wilson & Carole Howorth, Late Payment and Credit
Management in the Small Firm Sector: Some EmpiricalEvidence, INT'L SMALL Bus. J., Jan.
2000, at 17, 18 (noting the problems caused by late payment or nonpayment of credit for
smaller firms in the UK).
90. See Baird, Bris & Zhu, supra note 62; Leif M. Clark, Chapter]]-Does One Size Fit
All?, 4 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 168 (1996) (questioning whether chapter 11 is elastic
enough to accommodate the different entities filing under it); George W. Kuney, ABI
Commission Testimony: November 7, 2013, 15 TENN. J. Bus. L. 333, 334 (2014) (arguing for
revision of the Bankruptcy Code to allow for different treatment for small businesses).
91. For example, the interactions between debtors and lenders is a worthy area of study.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 159 (1997).
92. A study of chapter 11 cases filed between 1989 and 1995 indicated that "35.3 percent
of the cases were dismissed and 35.4 percent were converted [to chapter 7]." See Ed Flynn
Gordon Bermont, Outcomes of Chapter ]] Cases U.S. Trustee DatabaseSheds New Light on
Old Questions, Am. BANKR. INST. (Feb. 1, 1998), https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/outcomesof-chapter-11 -cases-us-trustee-database-sheds-new-light-on-old-questions;
Stephen
J.
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Furthermore, a significant portion of confirmed plans result in the liquidation
of the filing debtor.93 In deciding to focus only on reorganized cases, I noted
that preliminary inquiries had suggested that the treatment of preferential
transfers was significantly different between cases of liquidation and
reorganization, as explained in greater depth below.94 The simple reason for
this distinction was that in liquidation cases, neither party was concerned
with the effect of its actions on the business relationship, as the business
relationship would necessarily end. Furthermore, in liquidation cases, parties
besides the debtor were typically responsible for deciding whether, when,
and how to bring preference actions. 95 Accordingly, this analysis applies only
in the context of reorganization, and may not (indeed, is unlikely to) hold in
liquidation scenarios.
I further narrowed the scope of my potential pool of interviewees by only
contacting individuals in cases in which a preference action had been filed,
reflective of my particular interest in how preference actions were being used
and how they impacted trade creditors. Accordingly, my study was not, and
was not intended to be, reflective of the entire population of scenarios, or
even representative of cases that are filed. Instead, I sought out information
from parties in circumstances that were more relevant to my underlying
interest, which was how preferences impact a trade creditor's ongoing
business relationship with a debtor. However, in interviews with attorneys or
credit managers, these repeat players often referenced or compared their
experiences in chapter 11 to what they had seen in liquidation cases, large
cases, cases with lenders, or other circumstances not targeted for study.
Finally, I looked to cases that had been closed sometime in the previous
five years. I reasoned that, in limiting the scope of my research temporally, I
would be more likely to encounter businesses that were still in existence and
the subjects I contacted would be more likely to clearly remember the
Lubben, Business Liquidations 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 66-68 (2007) ("Very few creditors
ultimately receive the benefits of a chapter 11 liquidation - most chapter 11 cases convert to
chapter 7 and very few liquidating plans are ultimately confirmed.").
93. See Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The
Results of a Study andAnalysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 319 (1992) ("Of the 42 cases in
which the nature of the confirmed plan could be determined in the Poughkeepsie Study, 11
were liquidating plans or about 26 percent. Similarly, the Flynn Study estimated that
approximately 25 percent of the confirmed cases had liquidating plans."); Elizabeth Warren
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success ofChapter1]: A Challengeto the Critics, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 603, 641 (2009) (noting that less than 21% of confirmed Chapter 11 plans to be
liquidating plans).
94. See discussion infra note 212.
95. See discussion infra note 214.
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bankruptcy. I discovered that, even with this precaution, there were
inevitably subjects who had gone out of business or changed locations by the
time I attempted to contact them. In addition, I encountered individual
representatives of companies named in bankruptcy filings who had not
themselves been involved in the bankruptcy proceedings, often because they
joined the company after the bankruptcy filing had taken place.
In order to identify possible subjects, I used the Bloomberg Law search
engine to pull public bankruptcy records for all chapter 11 cases with a
confirmed plan that closed sometime between August 30, 2010 and February
1, 2017. I limited my search to companies with assets and liabilities in the
range of $1 million to $100 million that also listed unsecured trade creditors
in their schedules. Within the bankruptcy cases that fit these size and date
requirements, I looked for debtors that had filed a preference action against
a creditor, searching within court documents for any reference to § 547 (the
Bankruptcy Code section for preference avoidance). 96 This group became my
base sample.
For each of the cases within my sample, I identified the top twenty
unsecured creditors, as listed by the debtor on Official Form 4. I further
identified any additional creditors who were the subject of a preference
lawsuit, as reflected in the court record. Beginning with the five most recent
cases, and then taking one case at a time from the base sample group in
alphabetical order, I contacted these creditors, the debtor, and all the
attorneys who had entered an appearance in the case.97 Because I was
primarily interested in actions against trade creditors, I excluded taxing

96. The Bankruptcy Code allows for actions similar to preference avoidance in other
sections, which target specific behavior. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (2018) (allowing the
trustee to recover the amount set off by a creditor in the ninety days before bankruptcy on a
preference-like analysis). However, I did not target these provisions for consideration in my
study.
97. I began by sending introductory letters to individuals whose contact information was
listed in association with the creditors, debtors, and attorneys in my study. A copy of the letter
is attached as Appendix D. I continued to contact individuals associated with cases in the base
sample, beginning with the five most recent cases and then proceeding in alphabetical order,
until I had sent mailings to approximately 350 individuals. A few weeks after mailing the
letters, I attempted to call the individual creditors, debtors, and attorneys for whom I could
locate telephone numbers. Some individuals responded to my letter with requests not to be
contacted. For others, the introductory letter was returned as undeliverable. In these cases, I
did not make further attempts to contact the parties. If I was successful in reaching an
individual I made the request to interview him or her for this study. In many cases, I left
messages on voicemail or with an assistant. Where I left messages, I attempted a second phone
call before abandoning the contact.
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entities, insiders, creditors subject to an action under § 544,98 and judgment
creditors.99 Finally, due to language constraints and concerns regarding
communication costs, I excluded all creditors located outside the United
States.
Through these efforts, I was able to obtain complete interviews from fortyeight individuals,' including twenty-eight creditors, three debtors,' and
seventeen attorneys.' 02 These individuals were drawn from a total of twelve
bankruptcy cases. Of the attorneys, ten identified primarily as debtors'
98. These would typically be creditors who had not perfected their otherwise valid
security interests prior to the bankruptcy filing. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544, a bankruptcy
trustee is afforded all the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor who obtained a judicial lien over
all of the debtor's property as of the commencement of the case. Pursuant to the rules of
secured transactions, as reflected in UCC § 9-317(a), the bankruptcy trustee would prevail
over any secured creditor not perfected as of the date of filing.
99. The exclusion ofjudgment creditors was due primarily to my desire to focus on how
bankruptcy filings and preference actions affected business relationships between debtors and
creditors. When creditors were identified as judgment creditors, it appeared to distinguish
them from creditors who were or had been engaged in ongoing business dealings with the
debtor ("trade creditors"). I did not deliberately exclude trade creditors who had obtained a
judgment against the debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing.
100. Sampling for a qualitative research project is not necessarily a straightforward
endeavor, and there is some difference of opinion regarding the number of observations that
are sufficient to draw conclusions. However, the accepted literature indicates that this sample
size is within the range generally considered acceptable for a qualitative study. See Mark
Mason, Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative Interviews, FORUM:
QUALITATIVE Soc. REs., Sept. 2010, at 3, 10-13 (2010) (citing research suggesting that twentyfive to fifty participants are adequate, and that little "new" comes of out transcripts after twenty
interviews).
101. The ratio of debtor to creditor interviews largely reflects the overall ratio within cases.
Obviously, each individual debtor had multiple creditors. In addition, I found it difficult to
locate debtors to interview, as the individuals involved during a bankruptcy case were
frequently no longer associated with the company, their contact information had changed, or
they simply did not care to speak with me regarding their experiences. In several cases,
although the business continued as a going concern following chapter 11, it was through a sale
of substantially all assets to a new buyer, making the contact information listed in court filings
utterly obsolete. Accordingly, my findings are significantly skewed with regards to the
experience of creditors, although there is some insight to be had from the interviews I
conducted with debtors' attorneys, who often reported on the reactions they received in
advising debtors on bankruptcy and preference actions.
102. One attorney interviewed was referred to me by another study participant and so was
not contacted by virtue of his involvement in one of the sample cases. This attorney was
referred to me as someone particularly experienced in preference actions for mid-sized
companies. As explained below, because all attorneys spoke generally regarding their overall
experiences rather than providing specifics for a given case, participation in a case within the
sample was not essential.
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counsel. The remaining seven primarily represented creditors, although
virtually all attorneys had some experience working with both debtor and
creditor clients. Combined, the attorneys represented over 515 years of
experience. Among creditors, the size of the company with which individuals
were associated varied widely. Some creditors interviewed were sole
practitioners or "mom and pop" shops, while others were associated with
large international organizations. Interviewees self-identified as owners,
part-owners, CFOs, and credit managers of their companies. They
represented a diverse population geographically, hailing from eighteen
different states including New York, Florida, and California as well as
Kansas, Michigan, and North Dakota.
All interviews were conducted in a five-month period, between May 18,
2017 and October 18, 2017. Interviews lasted anywhere from ten minutes to
over an hour, with most falling in the range of fifteen- to twenty-minute
conversations. A discussion of the findings from these interviews follows.
III. Bankruptcy and Business Relationships
A. Study Findings
In my interviews with trade creditors, I followed a set script that asked
some preliminary questions regarding the creditor's size and type of
business. The script then asked about the creditor's pre-bankruptcy
relationship with the debtor and then the creditor's reaction upon receiving
news of the debtor's bankruptcy. It then inquired whether the creditor
continued to do business with the debtor after the bankruptcy filing. For
creditors that had been the subject of a preference action, the script asked
about the creditor's reactions upon learning of the preference demand, as well
as how the creditor ultimately responded to the preference demand.
Throughout, creditors were invited to share their thoughts on the bankruptcy
proceedings and if there were ways in which the experience could have been
better.' 03
In addition to interviewing creditors, I also interviewed some debtors. I
was less successful in locating debtors willing to be interviewed, but the
debtors who participated in the study spoke about their experiences, how
their relationships with creditors did or did not change as a result of the filing,
and how they had made decisions regarding whether to bring preference
104
actions.

103. A copy of the interview script used is attached as Appendix A.
104. A copy of the interview script used with debtors is attached as Appendix B.
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Finally, I included in the study a large number of attorneys who
represented both debtors and creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings. In
order to avoid violating confidentiality or imposing upon attomey-client
privilege, I asked attorneys to give their general thoughts on how debtors and
creditors navigated the bankruptcy process, and more specifically how the
decision to pursue a preference was made. I also asked questions regarding
their perceptions on how bankruptcy and preference actions influenced
business relationships between debtors and creditors.'o
Most of the creditors and creditors' attorneys I interviewed indicated that,
in cases where a business partner had filed for bankruptcy, creditors were
inclined to continue to do business with the debtor, provided there was
certainty in receiving payment going forward. To some extent, however, this
was informed by the nature of the business relationship prior to the
bankruptcy and the behavior of the debtor within the bankruptcy
proceedings. Creditors were particularly sensitive to the perceived reasons
for the bankruptcy filing in the first place, including whether it stemmed from
external influences or the debtor's individual trustworthiness. Creditors also
commented on the credit terms that the debtor would be afforded,
demonstrating some inclination to tighten credit post-bankruptcy but usually
not to withhold credit altogether. These findings are explained in more detail
below.
1. Forward-LookingProfits
Participants interviewed in this study largely expressed the sentiment that
future profits were more important than past losses and were therefore a
greater influence on decision-making. As expressed by one creditor:
[G]etting our product on the shelf is way more important than the
debt. So, we kind of overlook a lot of those things and we work
with our customers because we don't want to lose that shelf space,
and we don't want to lose any cooler space, so we really make
sure that our customers are a priority for us.'
Another creditor noted,
I think we still have a good relationship with the managers, with
the company.... [T]he name was changed and the whole structure
changed but the projects we were working on were still viable

105. A copy of the interview script used for both debtors' and creditors' attorneys is
attached as Appendix C.
106. Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017).

RELATIONAL PREFERENCESIN CHAPTER

2019]

10
1037

projects and we continued to do work on them. It didn't end our
relationship because we didn't get paid, it just hampered it....
[Y]ou never want to give up on a client that you have had some
success in helping them and they want to continue utilizing your
services, so, the bankruptcy is kind of rough waters, not
necessarily ending of the relationship.o 7
Other creditors also reported making decisions based on the opportunity
to preserve the business going forward. As one put it, "we're in the business
to make money," and doing business going forward often presented an
opportunity to make a profit. 0 s Court oversight of a DIP proved to be a
reassuring influence for some. As one credit manager observed,
If you continue to go forward[, i]t's actually better to sell to a
company when they're [a] debtor in possession, th[a]n when
they're not because they have a court order allowing them to
continue as a debtor in possession[. T]hey have to pay those
bills.1 09

Attorneys observed that creditors were likely to take a bankruptcy filing
in stride as an inevitable risk to be managed,11 0 and that post-filing business
was often desirable as a way of obtaining a profit, which might offset the loss
inherent in writing off bankruptcy debt."' It was more unusual to see
creditors flatly refuse to do business with a debtor after filing,1 2 although

.

107. Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 18, 2017).
108. Telephone Interview with C-JC (June 6, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with C
(July 11, 2017) ("We invested the write-off of our claim, but it's been, you know, we've still
maintained a long-term client and they continue to pay us whatever we bill them, at our
standard rates. So, it's a good paying, good realization in our world, a good margin for us.").
109. Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017).
110. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) ("It's usually pretty . .
diplomatic.. . . Nobody's getting really personal on things. . .. It's just kind of business as
usual.").
111. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) ("1 think for the most part, at least
our clients, I mean it's not like they get hopping mad about it, I think many of them accept it
as a cost of doing business."); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) ("Tomorrow's
sale is more important than yesterday's payment."); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17,
2017) (observing that trade creditors think about being paid going forward); Telephone
Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (claiming that trade creditors are primarily concerned with
not being "stung a second time around"); see also Telephone Interview with DA (June 20,
2017) ("[U]sually you end up working together which is why in most cases, by the time you
get to the confirmation period, we like to say it's a 'love-fest."').
112. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) ("1 think it was exceedingly rare
where a supplier would say, 'I just don't want to do business.' That was very rare.");
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creditor responses could vary depending on various factors, including the
sophistication of the creditor and the size of the claim." 3 As explained by
one debtor's attorney with over thirty-five years of experience in the field,
[Y]ou get a really mixed reaction.... But, generally I have found
that the unsecured creditors tend to work with the company[. Y]ou
know, they may get over some initial reluctance, but usually I
think their best interest is served by continuing the relationship
because they are selling to the debtor[] or providing goods and
services on an ongoing basis. And once in the [chapter] 11 the
debtor has to pay for them on a current basis[. A]nd on top of that
there's a chance for them to get paid something back on the prepetition claim. So, I haven't found that it's an altogether hostile
environment. Although, if there is distrust or there has been a long
pre-bankruptcy history between the debtors and the creditors, that
can lead to some ill will that you have to overcome during the
case.1

4

Despite this consensus, there were multiple creditors within the sample
who reported that they would not do business with a debtor following a
bankruptcy filing, in many instances referencing the costs associated with the
debtor's default or the bankruptcy itself. In several instances, the debtor's
failure to pay triggered payment obligations on the part of the creditor that
were particularly onerous, as in cases where the creditor represented a
facilitator for the transfer of goods."' In one particularly dramatic example,
the debtor's bankruptcy filing triggered obligations for the creditor that
forced the creditor to close its business entirely. A few months after that, the
principal of the creditor-who had inherited the company from his fatherTelephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (indicating that a bankruptcy filing impacts
business relationships "[n]ot as much as you might expect").
113. See Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017).
114. Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with
DA (July 14, 2017) ("[W]hen they find out they're in trouble there's sort of a mixed reaction
from the creditors.").
115. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) ("[For] the smaller local
companies, [bankruptcy] can be a big impact and it can be a significant shock to them.");
Telephone Interview with PC-R (Sept. 7, 2017) ("[W]hat we had to do was take $30,000 from
our savings and pay these people . . . . So, he paid the suppliers and we just sat and waited,
hoping to get the money back from [the debtor]. We never did."); Telephone Interview with
PC (Sept. 14, 2017) ("You don't just lose the money that they didn't pay you. You have to dip
into your own pocket and pay the land owner and the trucker so that you keep your
reputation.").
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"

took his own life."' As reported by the creditor's counsel in the bankruptcy
proceedings, the forced write-off proved "catastrophic" for the creditor, such
that the bankruptcy filing necessarily destroyed the business relationship by
destroying the business itself
Research suggests that this outcome is not altogether uncommon, although
perhaps more extreme than the norm in its consequences. At least one study
found that 66% of bankrupt businesses responding to a survey about nonpayment by trade creditors reported that it was a factor in forcing their own
bankruptcy filing."' Creditors I interviewed frequently noted the financial
impact the bankruptcy and subsequent write-off would have on their
company's finances. They also pointed to the costs of monitoring and
responding to bankruptcy filings that created financial stress on their own
businesses.119 One reported that the experience felt like "a continued, sort-of
death by 1,000 papercuts." 2 0 Ultimately, some of these creditors were
inclined to write off the relationship along with the debt.121
Still other creditors reported that the decision to continue in business with
a debtor depended on the circumstances. 122 The factors that influenced the
decision largely tracked concepts of trust and commitment, consistent with
the literature on business relationships.1 23 However, for most of the creditors
116. Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017).
117. Id.
118. See BRADLEY &RUBACH, supra note 63, at 4.
119. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017) ("[W]e thought at the end of
the day we would spend more in attorney's fees trying to go after this than we would in actually
collecting anything.").
120. Telephone interview with C (Oct. 18, 2017) ("[W]e were a small business and we
ended up being, I think, unfairly damaged.... [W]e couldn't or wouldn't retain an attorney to
try and sift through all of that. So, we were left to the mercy of the decisions of the bankruptcy
court and ultimately, we lost about $40,000 worth of services revenues in the bankruptcy.");
see also Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) ("[T]he general rule of thumb is if
they've . . .taken you for a loop in bankruptcy or a loss in bankruptcy, you don't want to get
back in there.").
121. See Telephone Interview with C (June 6, 2017) ("[G]enerally, we are not interested
in continuing to do business with the post-bankruptcy corporation or estate. . . . Let's spend
our resources in other directions."); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) ("[T]hey
have to give me an awfully good reason for me to continue to do business with them.").
122. See Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) ("It's a case-by-case basis here. I
worked other places that once they file and you take a loss, there's shut down and that is it, no
more nothing. When I came here, there would be a bankruptcy and they would turn right
around and do business with them."); Telephone Interview with C-N (May 22, 2017)
(describing evaluation that includes credit management company conclusions and credit
scores).
123. See discussion infra notes 155-64.
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in the sample, the question became not whether to continue doing business
with a debtor after bankruptcy but rather on what terms.1 24
A perceived benefit (or at least, a silver lining) to doing business with a
debtor post-bankruptcy is that payments from a debtor's estate receive
administrative priority.1 25 Furthermore, a debtor's finances are carefully
monitored by the court throughout the bankruptcy process.1 26 However, a
significant portion of creditors interviewed indicated that, even if they were
willing to do business with a bankrupt debtor, they would be unlikely to
extend terms as generous as those given pre-bankruptcy.1 27 Many creditors
indicated they would insist on a cash on delivery (COD) basis.1 28 Debtors
also described this change in treatment, with one debtor noting, somewhat
wistfully, "Before, you were a customer that they truly valued, and it's a little
bit of a shift. They now have the upper hand. They can be a little bit more
demanding than what they might have been in the past." 29 Although it was
less frequently acknowledged, there was some evidence that creditors would
also raise prices for a post-petition debtor as a means of recovering lost
profits from pre-bankruptcy sales.130
124. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) ("[A]bsent a showing ... that
this customer cannot be trusted, that the reason they filed in bankruptcy in part was to defraud
creditors. There's still trust, notwithstanding their filing bankruptcy. And then we do see that
there is an opportunity to preserve the trade relationship notwithstanding the Chapter 11 filing.
And a bit to go forward is to then ask the threshold. Can we manage credit risk with continued
credit extension with this customer?").
125. See supra note 51.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2018).
127. See Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) ("What we often see is even with
that, that assurance so to speak, and the priority, that may not be enough to result in the supplier
electing to provide terms to the customer going forward.").
128. See Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017); Telephone Interview with C-JO
(June 6, 2017) ("They can have an account, but they'll probably have to pay as they go.");
Telephone Interview with C-VK (June 6, 2017); Telephone Interview with C (July 11, 2017)
(requiring payments, if not on a COD basis, monthly); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11,
2017); Telephone Interview with C (Aug. 28, 2017); Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 11,
2017); Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 18, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with CA
(June 6, 2017) (observing that a pay upon delivery arrangement is "fairly customary" for trade
creditors following a bankruptcy).
129. Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with C
(Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that the company, although now a creditor, had filed for bankruptcy
previously and that "[it was] cash-in-advance until [it] got investment in capital in the business
to make people feel comfortable in extending terms again").
130. See Telephone Interview withD (June 22, 2017) (observing that some trade creditors
insisted on critical vendor status and subsequently charged a premium in addition to
demanding cash on delivery); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) ("Of course, when
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In summary, the consensus among those I interviewed appeared to be that
creditors were likely to continue doing business with a bankrupt debtor, so
long as the bankruptcy did not mean the liquidation of either party. Creditors
were usually inclined to continue providing goods and services because the
ongoing business would provide profits that could, at least in part, offset the
losses inherent in the write-off of bad debt. However, creditors were not
likely to continue doing business with debtors on the same terms as had been
enjoyed prior to the bankruptcy; rather, debtors would likely need to provide
cash on delivery. As explained below, however, these general principles were
influenced by the particularities of debtor behavior, both before and during
the bankruptcy proceedings.
2. Influence ofBehavior and Trust Priorto and DuringBankruptcy
Proceedings
Despite the consensus that it usually makes sense for a creditor to continue
doing business with a debtor following bankruptcy (particularly on a cash
basis), interviewees reported some nuance and distinction in how a creditor
reacts to a debtor in a given situation. Creditors and attorneys were quick to
reference different factors that could make a difference in the level of a trade
creditor's cooperation, both in the decision to continue doing business and in
the generosity of terms going forward. By far the two most frequently
referenced factors were communication and honesty regarding the situation,
both of which seemed to contribute to the creditor's ability to further trust
the debtor.
Attomeys-especially debtors' attomeys-seemed particularly attuned to
the need for a debtor to appear forthcoming, honest, and transparent in order
to encourage greater cooperation among creditors. As one attorney noted,
"Your most important asset . . . in any [c]hapter 11 reorganization is the
confidence of the creditors, the secured lenders, and that kind of thing. If the
vendors, secured lenders, banks think you're a crook, you're done."i 3 i
Attorneys frequently advised debtors to communicate with their creditors
[bankruptcy] happens there are opportunities to try and make your money back that you lost.
I mean if anybody is really being honest with you, they're going to say that."); Telephone
Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) ("I guess maybe a more cynical view is it's an effort to
recoup some pre-petition receivable....").
131. Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with CA
(June 21, 2017) ("[I]f they feel cheated they might want to be severing their relationship.");
Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) ("In general, my experience has been that if
the company or the debtor, has been generally forthcoming in its situation . .. and approaches
the bankruptcy filing in kind of a direct, relatively honest way, in my experience trade creditors
have not reacted negatively, have tended to be supportive.").

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

1042

[Vol. 71:1013

directly. As one observed, "You need to maintain your relationship with your
creditors as best you can. You know, it's kind of like, hiding doesn't do you
any good.... [S]o you're better off talking to them, trying to explain to them
what's going on . . ..

"132

Another noted,

I always encourage the debtor, particularly the smaller business,
the small-to-midsize business, to have direct communications
with the key creditors and the key vendors, explain why they're
there. There could be many reasons why you ended up in chapter
11, that it's not about their desire not to pay this particular creditor
and work businessperson to businessperson through it. Be as up
front as possible[.] . . . [T]he more information you can give

creditors about what's happening, what your timeline is, what
your expectations are the happier they are, the more willing they
are to work with you.133

At times, attorneys recommended that clients communicate with creditors
even in advance of filing, although many were also careful to point out that
there could be strategic reasons to wait until just after the time of filing.13 4
The importance of reaching out and the perceived need for timeliness in
communication were more pronounced the more important or valuable the
relationship was perceived to be.' 35
Interviews with creditors and their attorneys reinforced the wisdom of this
counsel. As one creditor with a relatively short history of transactions with
the debtor prior to bankruptcy admitted,

132. Telephone Interview withDA (May 25, 2017).
133. Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with
DA (May 19, 2017) ("[I]t's talking to them, letting them know what the problem is or what it
was, what created the problem, what were the issues. And a lot of times it's communication
and just trying to break down some of the barriers. Because, most of the time the unsecured
creditors really don't know what unique problems the debtor is facing and causing the
problem.").
134. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) ("One thing that's key from a
debtor's perspective is appropriate transparency.").
135. See Telephone Interview withDA (June 6, 2017) ("[T]ypically, what I do [i]f I've got
a small [debtor] . . . I tell them[,] . . .'Look, if you've got a local supplier or contractor,
somebody you need, get them some money before you file, tell them what you're doing and
why.' And, that works. It kind of takes some of the sting out of getting a bankruptcy notice
cold."); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (" [E]xplain the circumstances and tell
them that you want to keep doing business."); Telephone Interview withDA (Aug. 31, 2017)
("Where it's an important vendor and the relationship's important[,] my advice is usually to
let them know either shortly in advance of the filing or upon the filing.").
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I mean it sort of becomes personal.... I don't know if it would
have changed if they called me prior to or would have notified me
that they were having some financial difficulties, and so forth.
Then maybe I would have had a better feeling about the whole
situation. But, it was a surprise.... I would not want to do any
business with them in the future.' 3 6
The unpleasantness of surprise was echoed by others, many of whom felt
as though an honest debtor would have or should have reached out in advance
of the filing.' 3 7 In at least one interview, the reason given for wanting advance
notice was not only so the creditor could prepare itself, but also so the creditor
could have explored "some way we could have worked with them to avoid
filing."' 38 Attorneys reported seeing similar responses in practice, indicating
that creditors were more willing to be cooperative after the fact in situations
where creditors felt the debtor had been upfront and transparent with
solvency issues, 3 9 or even apologetic about the financial failure. 140 One
debtor interviewed indicated that the company had decided to inform its
creditors of the trouble six months prior to bankruptcy, and it reported a
particularly high level of cooperation from creditors post-bankruptcy as a
4

'

consequence.'

Creditors seemed to be particularly sympathetic to debtor explanations
that identified outside factors as the ultimate cause for filing, which is
consistent with the findings of previous studies on relationships' response to
stress.1 4 2 Multiple creditors reported maintaining relationships with debtors
and being motivated to cooperate in bankruptcy proceedings because the
136. Telephone Interview with C-B (July 14, 2017).
137. See Telephone Interview with C (June 7, 2017) ("[I]f he had tried to work with us
before then . .. you know, we could probably still do business."); Telephone Interview with
C-B (July 14, 2017) ("1 wish they would have been more [communicative] and reached out to
me."); Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 8, 2017) ("They could have notified me ahead of
time. That would have helped, because it came out of the blue.");
138. Telephone Interview with C (Oct. 11, 2017).
139. See Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) ("[I]n general in those situations
[where debtors have given a false view of the financial wherewithal of the company], creditors
feel jilted and usually there's a trust relationship that's been built up many times with trade
creditors over the years so in those cases there's a very sour feeling.").
140. See Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) ("[A]nother point we always try
to make is, we really feel badly about the accrued payable. There's nothing we can do about
that now .... ).
141. See Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017).
142. See Jonathan D. Hibbard, Nirmalya Kumar & Louis W. Stern, Examining the Impact
ofDestructive Acts in Marketing ChannelRelationships, J. MKTG. RES., Feb. 2001, at 45, 54.

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

1044

[Vol. 71:1013

debtor had made clear that the bankruptcy filing was a consequence of a third
party's actions, such as the bank pulling a loan or an essential account of the
debtor going unpaid. 4 31In other scenarios, the debtor's industry could make
a difference, like where creditors within the industry were generally aware of
financial pressures that could lead a party to file and were thus more
sympathetic.' As eloquently expressed by one creditor, "[W]hen you don't
have no money, you don't have no money."145
However, if creditors were sympathetic in cases where the debtor seemed
to be a victim of its circumstances, they tended to be highly unsympathetic
when the bankruptcy appeared to be deliberate and strategic. As one creditor
reported, the owner of the creditor and the principal of the debtor had
maintained a personal relationship prior to the bankruptcy. ' 6 The debtor
made reassurances to the creditor in the days leading up to bankruptcy, but it
then cut off all communication upon filing. '47 As a consequence, the creditor
"was very angry.

. .

. [H]e felt like [the debtor] had lied to him and kind of

just strung him along . . . . [H]e felt definitely betrayed." 4 Moreover, the
creditor asserted that moving forward, "the owner here wouldn't service
anything of [the debtor's] even if he came begging us." 49 Other creditors
echoed the sentiment that, once a debtor had lost their trust, the debtor had
also lost any hope of doing business going forward.'
Beyond honest communication prior to and during the bankruptcy,
interviewees also suggested that the amount of payout within the bankruptcy
could have an effect on creditors' decisions to cooperate with debtors, and
143. See Telephone Interview with C-JC (June 6, 2017) (describing explanation for
debtor's financial woes indicated debtor had good intentions but no cash, prompting creditor
to extend them credit quickly); Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) (referencing
instance where bank pulled the debtor's line).
144. See Telephone Interview with C-JO (June 6, 2017) (e.g., oil and gas).
145. Telephone Interview with C-E (May 22, 2017).
146. Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017); Telephone Interview with C-JC
(June 6, 2017) ("Ifthey can't stay true to their word and their promise that they said that they
were going to pay us, then there is a character flaw there. So, we don't care to do business
with that."); see also Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) ("[S]ometimes if you feel
like the guy hasn't been honest or truthful with you, it may not matter how much. There's no
way you're doing business with them again."). In some cases, the reason for the loss of trust
was unknowable. One debtor's principal reported that he had lost a "very, very close
relationship" with a creditor because "it just became totally personal," even despite the
debtor's efforts to communicate "almost daily." Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017).
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many connected the willingness to pay with perceptions of honesty and being
true to one's word. As one creditor observed, if a debtor voluntarily repaid
its discharged debt following a bankruptcy proceeding, this would be an
expression of honesty and trustworthiness, and "I would instantly give them
credit. No problem at all."' 5 1Beyond what the plan payment had to say about
trust and commitment, however, interviewees did not agree on whether the
amount repaid had an independent influence on cooperation.1 5 2
3. Influence ofPre-existing Relationship Commitment
In addition to referencing specific acts demonstrating trustworthiness or
betrayal, interviewees frequently pointed to perceptions regarding the preexisting relationship or ongoing relationship commitment as a deciding
factor in how to respond to a debtor's bankruptcy. These references were
again consistent with prior research, which has observed that "efforts at
nurturing trust and commitment with dealers builds a reservoir of goodwill
on which the supplier can draw in the face of perceived destructive events." 53
Creditors indicated that the previous length and quality of the relationship
would be a factor in a decision to continue the relationship following a
bankruptcy. 5' 4 As expressed by one creditor,
[The decision to continue a relationship after bankruptcy is] not
necessarily credit collection's decision . . . sometimes it's the
decision of our sales people that are involved. How they view the
relationship as a group, we talk about the ability of the company
to actually come out of the bankruptcy. Whether or not it's a

151. Telephone Interview with C-JC (June 6, 2017).
152. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017) ("[I]f the payout is small, they may
be hesitant to deal with the debtor going forward, because they don't want to get burned
again."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) (indicating that in cases where
unsecured creditors attempt to undermine the reorganization, the motivation may be in the
payout but, even more so, may be "what led up to the filing, how they contested litigation or
things like that"); Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (observing that in one case
creditors receiving a 15% payout over several years were notably cooperative "because they
want the company to succeed"). In one of the surveyed cases, the debtor did manage to pay
all unsecured credit in full, and creditors reported being very satisfied with the outcome, as
well as continuing their relationship with the debtor. Telephone Interview with PC (May 18,
2017); see also Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017).
153. Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, supra note 143, at 57.
154. See Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017).
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relationship we'd like to continue, if we see some benefit in
it

....

Thus, the quality of the relationships in the past directly influenced the
perceived ongoing value of the relationship.' At least one debtor noted that
creditors were more likely to be cooperative if there was a "human" rather
than a "corporate" relationship between the two companies and that a lack of
such a relationship "has dramatically harmed us. "157
In some cases, the strength of the relationship commitment, at least on the
creditors' side, might have arisen less from positive past experiences and
more from the size or importance of the debtor. Often, creditors would
explain their ongoing relationship with a debtor by pointing to the lack of
alternative business in the area. 1' As one creditor put it, "there's not a lot of
forty[-]store chains out here bouncing around that we can go get their
business."159 Others reflected similar sentiments. 60
A second narrative that arose-somewhat unexpectedly-from the
interviews demonstrated that, just as relationships could be damaged beyond
repair by a debtor's perceived betrayal, so relationships could be ended based
on the debtor's loss of trust in a creditor. Several interviewees referenced
situations where the debtor, while generally attempting to preserve
relationships, might elect not to continue doing business with particular
creditors because of their actions during the bankruptcy proceedings. In one
case, the debtor observed that two of its most essential trade creditors had
joined a creditor's committee and then insisted on being critical vendors,
155. Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017).
156. See Telephone Interview with C-JO (June 6, 2017) ("This sounds terrible, but part of
it probably depends on the type of customer they had been up to the bankruptcy."); see also
Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) (noting that trade creditor reaction to bankruptcy
will largely depend on the history between the trade creditor and debtor).
157. Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with DA
(May 25, 2017) (observing that close business relationships can be very helpful to a debtor in
bankruptcy).
158. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017).
159. Id. (observing that even though debtor was always a late payer, they "had to suck it
up and appreciate their business and continue servicing their stores").
160. Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017) ("[I]f they're a massive chain .., we still
service [them]."); see also Telephone Interview with C-E (May 22, 2017); Telephone
Interview with D (June 2, 2017) ("[T]hey stayed with us for two reasons: [1] relationships, I
mean if we didn't have the relationship with the vendor, they wouldn't have stayed[,] . . . [2]
they need us on a go-forward basis as much as we need them, if not more."); Telephone
Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (noting that relationship commiitment post-bankruptcy
depends on how important the debtor is as a customer).
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charging a premium on goods and services going forward and demanding
payment on a cash-only basis. The debtor responded, somewhat indignantly,
by finding new vendors.1 6 1 In other cases, a creditor's decision regarding
whether to join a creditor committee was itself viewed as a possible betrayal,
insofar as it meant taking an adversarial stance against the debtor.1 6 2
IV Preferences
When interviewees described a general willingness of trade creditors to
cooperate with debtors post-filing, they frequently introduced an unprompted
caveat concerning debtors that filed preference actions against creditors. As
one debtor's counsel put it, "that'd be a point where [trade creditors] would
draw a line."1 63 Although relatively common within bankruptcy proceedings
generally, 64 preference actions are notorious for being poorly understood by
the population at large, including businessmen and creditors. This is true even
among those who are generally informed regarding bankruptcy laws.
Accordingly, individuals and companies who find themselves on the wrong
end of preference liability are, more often than not, shocked and outraged at
the prospect of owing money back to the debtor's estate on account of
otherwise legal collection activity. 6' As reported by the attorneys I
interviewed, it was not uncommon for business people to express a sense of
disbelief that avoidance actions pursuant to preference liability are the law of
the land, describing preference law as unfair, outrageous, and even "unAmerican."i66

161. Telephone Interview with D (June 22, 2017) ("That's not [being] a critical vendor,
that's being a thief .... ).
162. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017) (noting that the debtor was not
happy with the creditor's affiliation with the committee because "they thought that I was suing
them too"); Telephone Interview withD (June 2, 2017) (noting that cooperative trade creditors
were actively recruited to sit on the creditor's committee, but made a point of asking the
debtor's advice first, and then typically electing not to sit on the committee); Telephone
Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (noting that creditors avoid sitting on the creditor's
committee because they do not want to be viewed as the enemy of the debtor).
163. Telephone Interview withDA (Aug. 31, 2017).
164. See TABB, supra note 78, at 488.
165. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017).
166. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) ("One of the hardest things for a
practicing attorney to explain is to the creditor who gets a preference demand letter. And it's
usually, '[W]hat kind of country is this? This is unconstitutional. This is un-American."').
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A. Reactions to PreferenceLiability

'

The perception of preference actions as a betrayal and destroyer of
relationships was practically universal across interviewees. Preference
actions were described as the height of betrayal, "a slap in the face," 6 7
particularly insofar as they target creditors who "view themselves as trying
to help during this time of distress" by continuing to extend credit.'6 8 In one
case, a preference action was brought against a creditor with a long-standing
prior relationship with the debtor's principal. In that scenario, the creditor
indicated that the debtor "knew, well in advance that this was about to
happen. And, [he] continued to do business as usual . .
."169 In expressing
his outrage and disbelief at the perceived betrayal, the creditor indicated, "I
mean in all honesty, he better never turn the corner and see me."170 As another
creditor put it, "This is stealing. I don't care what the regulations are saying,
you can declare bankruptcy whenever and you can take money back from us?
It's still stealing from us."' 7
Not surprisingly, based on these reactions, interviewees frequently
reported the expectation that a preference action would spell the end of the
relationship between debtor and creditor, no matter the length of the
relationship.1 72 As one debtor's attorney opined, "I think if you file a
preference action against [creditors], they get completely irrational. Now
you're trying to take something away that they already got, and that will
make most of them livid and they will cease doing business with you."1 73 As
another explained, "a creditor can live with the idea that they're not going to
get paid on their debt. What they can't live with, what is totally unacceptable
and foreign, is the idea of giving the money back, and they haven't been
167. Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017).
168. Id.
169. Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017).
170. Id.
171. Telephone Interview withPC (June 19, 2017).
172. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) ("[T]he person who you're

collecting it from, they're never going to do business with you again or sell you whatever
they're selling you."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) ("If there was a

relationship there isn't going to be afterwards."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 20,
2017) ("That's usually ... the thing that can put the creditor over the edge."); Telephone
Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) ("Well, no question, it affects [the relationship]
negatively."); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) ("They're not going to want to do

business with you.... It's a disincentive to put it mildly."); see also Telephone Interview with
CA (May 18, 2017); Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with
CA (May 30, 2017).
173. Telephone Interview withDA (May 25, 2017).
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paid."' Attorneys were so confident in their conclusions that a preference
action would end a business relationship that they often reported advising
their clients to avoid preference actions against any individual with whom
they would like an ongoing relationship."' Many creditors who had been
subject to preference actions affirmed this perception, reporting that they
ceased to do business with the company that sued them based on a lingering
"sour taste" in the mouth, whether or not the preference suit was successfully
defended."'
However, this perspective was not universally shared, nor universally
demonstrated among interviewees. One highly experienced creditors'
attorney opined that most creditors are too focused on sales going forward to
get hung up on the insult of past preference actions."' This opinion found
support in reports of creditors who continued their relationship with a
reorganized debtor, or more often, the purchaser of the debtor, even after a
preference action had been prosecuted against them. The reasons creditors
gave for continuing the relationship despite their keen sense of betrayal and
frustration included the need to sell product and the desire to continue good
relationships with principals of the debtor, who creditors often did not view
as responsible for the preference action itself As one creditor reported, it
continued to do business with the reorganized debtor "because sometimes
we'll have a [product] that nobody else wants. . . . If we can sell it to

somebody else, we definitely do." " Another explained that they continued
to do business with the reorganized debtor "only because I did trust the
CEO," and wanted to see a twenty-year project to completion. 7 9 They added,
"If I had not known the CEO ahead of time and if I had not dealt with him
personally, and known of his character, [the preference action] would have

174. Telephone Interview withDA (July 17, 2017).
175. See discussion infra note 214.
176. See Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) ("1 do kind of have a little sour taste
in my mouth about that. . . . I don't know that I would be willing to do business with that
company again."); Telephone Interview with PC (Aug. 31, 2017) (reporting that, after doing
business with the debtor for 10-15 years prior, they gave up the relationship based on the
amount lost in the preference claim); Telephone Interview with PC-L (Sept. 7, 2017) ("We
have nothing to do with them whatsoever. . . . It left a nasty taste in everybody's mouth.");
Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 2017) ("1 wouldn't touch that thing with a ten-footpole, man. Are you kidding?").
177. Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017).
178. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017).
179. Telephone Interview with C (Sept. 8, 2017).
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left a very bitter taste in my mouth too."'s As noted by one attorney, the
ability of creditors to compartmentalize their frustration with preference
actions and distinguish between the perceived betrayal of the debtor and the
ongoing trustworthiness of the reorganized debtor may be influenced by the
fact that most preference actions are brought by third parties, such as a
liquidating trust or the creditor's committee. 181
B. The Impact ofPreferenceActions on Trade Creditors and Its Influence
on Trade Credit
Discussions with interviewees indicated that preference actions impose a
significant burden on creditors, particularly when creditors are less
sophisticated and therefore less able to anticipate the loss and expense
associated with a preference action. As one creditor operating a family
business reported, the delay between the payment and the claw-back was
highly problematic. "It's not like you've just received money, and when you
do receive money, you've already put out a whole lot in order to make the
money and you have a lot of bills to pay . . . ."182 Particularly for smaller
businesses, maintaining a consistent cash flow is a constant concern,1 8 3
making unwelcome and unanticipated costs particularly burdensome. In
summary, "it was really hard emotionally and it was hard financially on us
to have to give that money back."'8 4 A further burden was often imposed by
the perceived need to hire an attorney, which inevitably added to creditors'
expenses, although it often resulted in a more favorable outcome in the
preference action.8 5
Creditors, particularly those who encountered preference actions for the
first time, tended to respond to the perceived increased risk for future
preference actions by restricting their future credit. As one creditor
explained,

180. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with C (Sept. 8, 2017) (reporting ongoing
relationship with the same company based on relationship with the same CEO).
181. See discussion infra note 214; Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017).
182. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017).
183. See Email from Paul Schrader, Fullerton Law, to Brook E. Gotberg (Mar. 29, 2018,
08:31 CST) (on file with author) (noting the importance of short run cash flow to creditors).
184. Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017).
185. See Telephone Interview withPC (Sept. 8, 2017) (settling for 5% of demand, but paid
three times that amount in attorneys' fees); Telephone Interview with PC-L (Sept. 7, 2017)
(defending preference action after hiring an attorney); Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14,
2017) (noting the expense of the preference action included thousands in attorneys' fees).
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Nobody's ever owed me that much money again. . . . I've got
customers that I've done business with for years, same kind of
situation, and basically, I'd let them get maybe [thirty to ninety]
days out on me. Don't do it no more. You just lock them into
[thirty] days, and if they don't you cut them off It's just not worth
the risk. . . . [I]t makes you tighten up all of your financial aid to
people, which makes it hard for these other businesses because
you won't extend them as much credit. But you just can't afford
to take these risks anymore. You can't extend credit to guys
anymore.. .. [M]ost everybody is on a cash basis: you want it,
you pay me and you get it. "6
Others echoed this approach, reporting that they had tightened their credit
terms for all customers after the preference action.'s
C. Strategic Preference Actions
Attorneys, both on the debtor and the creditor side, largely recognized
preference actions as strategic tools and referenced decisions to bring
preference actions selectively. Both debtors and debtors' counsel reported
acknowledging the harm that preference actions can cause to debtor/creditor
relationships, and they accordingly expressed reluctance to bring preference
actions unless absolutely necessary or strategically desirable. Most attorneys
agreed that preference actions could be brought or abandoned pursuant to the
debtor's strategic needs.
Accordingly, attorneys who represented debtors frequently reported that
they would not pursue preference actions that were likely to permanently
terminate important business relationships."' Citing the "unwritten rules of
a preference action," one attorney put it bluntly: "[W]here a debtor
186. Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017).
187. See Telephone Interview with PC-B (Sept. 7,2017) ("[W]e're more risk-averse [now]
than we were, so that means companies that need help don't get as much of our expertise.");
Telephone Interview with C (Sept. 14, 2017). This reaction is consistent with that observed in
other studies. See Hibbard, Kumar & Stern, supra note 143, at 54 (observing that perceived
acts of betrayal lead to disengagement). For an interesting analysis of a study on practice
reciprocity, or how players in a strategy game respond to acts of defection or cooperation, see
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 118-20 (1984).
188. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) ("[W]hat is the impact of me suing
this trade creditor going to have on my business?"); Telephone Interview with CA (June 21,
2017) ("If you are on the debtor's side you never want to file [preference actions] unless you
hate the creditor that you're filing against. I mean, because it's not good business.");
Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) ("1 can't recall, sitting here, an instance where
we filed a preference claim against a post-petition vendor.").
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reorganizes and continues to do business with the vendor, that vendor is not
going to get sued for a preference."' 89 Counsel also pointed to the probable
negative consequences for the debtor's reputation as a reason not to pursue
preference actions.190 The overall result was that preference actions tended
not to be brought in a reorganization where the business would continue as a
going concern.' 9
Not all attorneys agreed with the view that preference actions are
permissive rather than mandatory. Two of the seventeen interviewed
expressed the opinion that the debtor would be required to make a demand
for an available preference, even if the debtor did not wish to do so out of
concern for the potential impact on the debtor's relationship. They cited the
fact that, in bankruptcy, the DIP becomes a fiduciary to its creditors, who in
turn become the residual owners of the business in the way that shareholders
are in solvent companies. 9 2 In addition, they pointed to concerns that, should
the DIP not pursue obvious preferences, the creditors could make a stronger
case for appointing a trustee over the estate who would pursue the
preferences.1 93 Other creditors appeared to acknowledge this second concern,
but they suggested that such pressure rarely comes into play following plan
189. Telephone Interview withDA (Sept. 8,2017).
190. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) ("[Y]eah I've got preferences, but
I don't intend to assert them because I think the cost of doing business and the reputation[]
loss . . . is not worth the effort."); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (noting that
it is a balancing act to decide whether recovery of the preference amount is worth the cost to
the relationship).
191. See Telephone Interview withDA (May 19, 2017) ("[I]f you're working with a client
and he's selling you something that you need and you have a good relationship with him,
you're not going to sue him. . . . Especially if your plan's been confirmed. I just don't see that
happening much. But, you do see it a lot in the liquidation cases."); Telephone Interview with
DA (May 25, 2017) ("[T]ypically, in a true reorganization as opposed to a sale case or a
liquidation . . . [a] true reorganization you normally give up, waive, any right to bring
preference actions as part-and-parcel of your confirmation process."); Telephone Interview
with CA (May 30, 2017) ("[A]n ongoing Chapter 11 debtor that needs the relationship [is] not
going to pursue the preference action against a party that is needed for the business .... );
Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) ("Is it a liquidation or a reorganization?
Because, there is more likely to be a preference action[] actually pursued in a liquidation.
Because, otherwise the creditor relationships are more important in a reorganization.").
192. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) ("1 think you have to. I don't think
you're doing your job if you don't. . . . [Y]our debtor's a fiduciary, they got to do what's
right."); Telephone Interview withDA (June 23, 2017) ("You really can't do that, when you're
representing a chapter 11 debtor. You're a fiduciary of the debtor in possession.").
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018) (allowing the court may order the appointment of a
trustee on request of a party "if such appointment is in the interests of the creditors");
Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017).
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confirmation, which is when a preference action is most likely to be
brought.1 94 Attorneys also noted that the presence or absence of possible
defenses would weigh into the calculation of whether to file a preference
action,1 95 although demands made through an informal letter campaign might
be made at the drop of a hat.1 96 It appears unsettled whether a debtor has a
legal duty to bring available preference actions; nevertheless, the issue raises
interesting questions about the extent to which a debtor's fiduciary duties in
a reorganization involve engaging in potentially self-destructive actions.
For most attorneys, however, preference actions were desirable only in
cases where the targeted creditor was no longer important to the debtor or the
preference action was otherwise viewed as strategically necessary. 197 Several
attorneys did acknowledge bringing a preference action as a strategic defense
to encourage the reduction of a creditor's claim against the estate.1 98 In these
194. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017). Some reported cases have
indicated that creditors may force a preference action, or obtain standing to bring a preference
action, in scenarios where the debtor has failed to do so. See, e.g., Canadian Pac. Forest Prods.
Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson), 66 F. 3d 1436, 1438 (6th Cir. 1995) (permitting a single
creditor to initiate an action to avoid a preferential transfers if the creditor has demonstrated a
likelihood of success, and a demand on the debtor to bring the action has been unjustifiably
refused). The court in In re Gibson specifically cited to concerns that the debtor would use
preference actions "as a sword to favor certain creditors over others," noting that "we do not
believe Congress intended to exclude creditors from seeking to avoid preferential or fraudulent
transfers where the debtor-in-possession [so] abuses its discretion." Id. at 1441.
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). For an explanation of these exceptions, see Gotberg, supra
note 5, at 67-77.
196. This observation was even more accurate outside the chapter 11 context, particularly
for chapter 7 trustees. See supra note 21; Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017);
Telephone Interview withDA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview withDA (June 23, 2017)
(" [Y]ou're going to send at least a demand to see if he can shake the trees and get money out
of them."); Telephone Interview withDA (July 14, 2017) ("Mostly people look at preferences
like, let me try and shake the tree to see if I can get some extra money.").
197. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) ("1 mean it's only a good idea if
you really need the money. But, if you're going to get your plan confirmed and it's financed
then it's been confirmed, there isn't a great need for the preference recovery, unless you just
have to collect some money. And so, it almost doesn't pay to do it."); Telephone Interview
with CA (May 25, 2017) (noting the filing of preference claims when "the principal didn't
really care about the creditor anymore, didn't need the creditor's support"); Telephone
Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) ("[I]f you want to have a good supply relationship with
your vendors, or if you want the gardener to mow your lawn, you're not going to be suing
them. Or, if you do it, you file a lawsuit as a cover for you doing your fiduciary duty, but
'wink' let's do a deal whereby, you know, that's favorable.").
198. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (detailing preference action that
was brought to reduce size of claim); Telephone Interview with D (June 2, 2017) (reporting
that preference action was brought against a particular creditor because "[t]hey became
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cases, the loss of the business relationship was acknowledged as a foregone
conclusion because it was usually viewed as beyond saving.' 99 Other
strategic uses for preference actions included bringing the suit in order to
exclude the creditor's claim so that the targeted creditor would be ineligible
to vote on the plan of reorganization.2 00
Another interesting point regarding the use of preference actions in
reorganization cases was the frequently-raised issue of timing. A preference
action may be brought up to two years after the bankruptcy filing,201 and
potentially longer if a trustee is appointed or the case is subsequently
converted to a chapter 7 proceeding. Accordingly, a creditor can be subject
to a demand for repayment of a preference after it has already agreed to a
plan of reorganization and accepted a reduced payout plan for its remaining
debt.202 Depending on the case, the plan of reorganization may have already
been confirmed.20 3

exceptionally, outrageously aggressive, trying to create things that didn't exist"); Telephone
Interview with D (June 22, 2017) (explaining that preference action was used "to try to
ascertain and force somebody to make a decision or negotiate for the sake of the company so
that we're not stuck in a legal battle forever, trying to figure out who has first right to anything
and to be able to function").
199. See Telephone Interview with D (June 22,2017).
200. See Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017). It was unclear on what basis
bringing the preference action would disqualify a given creditor. A pending cause of action
against a creditor could make the creditor ineligible to serve by virtue of a conflict of interest.
See In re First Republic Bank Corp.,95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998). Alternatively, if
the creditor's claim is disallowed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) for failure to turnover
property subject to a preference action, the creditor may not be permitted to serve on the
committee.
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2018).
202. See id. As one interviewee pointed out, preference actions may even be made against
individuals who were not creditors at the time the chapter 11 plan was voted on and confirmed,
but who subsequently become creditors, bound by the plan, when the debtor brings a
preference action against them. Such a result has the effect of disenfranchising creditors and
it raises questions regarding whether preference actions should only be allowed prior to plan
confirmation. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) ("1 think there's a fair
argument to be made that preference and other avoidance actions must be brought[,] if at all,
pre-confirmation.").
203. There is no stated timeframe in which a plan must be confirmed, although a court may
allow other parties to propose a plan if the debtor has not successfully confirmed a plan within
a given time frame. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121. For most cases, preference actions will still be
available after plan confirmation. See Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned
Cases, and Refiling Rates: An EmpiricalAnalysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 571, 582-83 (2015) (finding a duration mean of 430 days between filing and
confirmation of plans for companies in traditional chapter 11 cases after 2005).
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Attorneys seemed particularly attuned to this discrepancy, and they noted
the strategic advantage of waiting to file a preference action until after the
plan had been confirmed, in large part, because the debtor would no longer
require the targeted creditor's vote in favor of confirmation.204 For at least
one creditor, the strategy was somewhat effective. 2 05 In addition, attorneys
noted that preference actions may be a bargaining chip with a creditor's
committee, which may be for or against the pursuit of such actions in any
given case, and preferences may be explicitly dealt with in the plan.206 One
attorney also suggested that the delay can help the debtor because the creditor
will have already made the choice to continue doing business with the
company.207 When the company commences timely payment in bankruptcy,
this encourages further continuation of business despite a subsequent
preference action.208
More commonly, interviewees reported that companies in reorganization
would decline to bring preference actions at all, instead assigning such
actions to a separate trust or to the creditor's committee itself 209 In doing so,

-

204. See Telephone Interview withDA (May 19, 2017) ("[A] lot of times, people wait until
after the plan is confirmed and then sometimes they'll pursue those actions and sometimes
not."); Telephone Interview withDA (June 23, 2017) ("1]f it's in a chapter 11 you typically
try to avoid doing those [preference actions] until after the plan's confirmed or something.
Because if you do that during the pendency of the case you're going to not have a very happy
creditor. They're not going to be too terribly supportive of your reorganization efforts."). This
activity has been taken to some extremes, as in the case of In re DPH Holdings Corp., in which
the debtor requested, and was granted, leave to file preference complaints under seal prior to
obtaining confirmation. Filing of the complaints was necessary to toll the statute of limitations,
but the debtor argued successfully before the court that the actions should be kept secret so as
to not affect the vote. See Jeffrey A. Wurst & Michael T. Rozea, Secret Extensions
Preference Actions Avoiding the Statute of Limitations, ABF J. (March 2011) at
https://www.abfjournal.com/articles/secret-extensions-preference-actions-avoiding-thestatute-of-limitations/.
205. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 30, 2017) ("[W]e didn't know about the
preference until two years after they declared bankruptcy.").
206. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) ("[W]e've seen a trend a little bit
in some retail cases where a negotiated resolution with the creditor's committee may be that
the debtor agrees not to file preference cases. So, it's a negotiating tool, and usually you wait
until the end unless there's a significant preference issue that you need to file early in the
case."); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (explaining situation in which creditor's
committee obtained the right to preferential transfers from a liquidating trust, but only "against
vendors that were no longer deemed critical").
207. Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017).
208. See id.
209. This approach has been upheld as lawful. See, e.g., Commodore Int'l Ltd. v. Gould
(In re Commodore Int'l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a creditors'
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the debtor could assert plausible deniability in the face of creditor outrage.21
One attorney explained that, particularly in recent years, the model has
shifted from atrue organization to a sale of the business and the establishment
of a liquidating trust.2 11 As a consequence, the debtor need not concern itself
with the ongoing business relationships; instead, these relationships become
the concern of the purchaser of the debtor's assets.212 Attorneys
overwhelmingly reported that buyers of assets as a going concern were
concerned with the impact preference actions had on business relationships.
Often, attorneys advised buyers to purchase any preference claims as part of
the agreement and then abandon those claims to avoid disruption to necessary
business relationships. 2 13 As one attorney put it, "if I represent a buyer [then]
I'll buy the preference claims too if I can[,] [b]ecause I can just cancel. If I
buy the business, then I will buy the preference
claims so that I don't have
2 14
some bankruptcy estate suing my suppliers."
In summary, debtors and their representatives generally acknowledged
that preference actions harm debtor efforts to reorganize and are accordingly
avoided if at all possible. When they are pursued, it is because the targeted
creditor is no longer deemed essential to the debtor's reorganization efforts,
committee may acquire standing to pursue the debtor's claims with consent of the DIP or the
trustee, when the suit is in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate and "necessary and
beneficial" to the fair and efficient resolution of the case).
210. See id. ("[W]e tried very hard to peel off the preference actions into a trust for the
benefit of creditors. So, that when the company reorganized and the trustee went and did those
preference actions and the creditors screamed, we as counsel to the reorganized debtor could
say, 'That's not us."').
211. See Telephone Interview withDA (June 19, 2017) ("[T]his isn't the older days where
we actually had . . . to worry about those kinds of continued relationship issues. It's just
different. [Debtors don't worry about a continuing relationship] because they're not going to
be the debtor, typically. I mean, almost every case ends up in a [§]363 sale."); see also Douglas
G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 69, 73 (2004); Elizabeth
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Remembering Chapter 7, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (2004).
212. Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) ("[S]o then it's really the new buyer
that has to worry about how the outstanding preferences are going to impact its purchase.").
213. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) ("Sometimes the buyer will
buy those litigation claims and not ever pursue them because the buyer doesn't want a
liquidating trustee to sue them because they're suppliers now."); Telephone Interview with
CA (July 26, 2017) ("[W]e have seen in the sale of asset cases where buyers through their
asset purchase agreements . . . then assum[e] the preference actions, essentially buying those
actions from the bankruptcy estate, and out of the self-interest that they don't want to[] sue
future customers as part of their acquisition .... ); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8,
2017) ("The buyer, I think the vast majority of the time, negotiates to protect vendors that they
will continue to do business with.").
214. Telephone Interview withDA (July 14, 2017).
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or because the strategic advantage of the preference outweighs its perceived
harm. Furthermore, when actions are brought, DIPs take pains to transfer
them to third parties to prosecute in order to absolve themselves of
responsibility in the eyes of creditors. These findings speak to how
preference avoidance actions are actually viewed and used in chapter 11 and
why.
V RelationalPreferences
The reported use of preference actions as a strategic measure to distinguish
between favored and less-favored creditors is shocking when preferences are
understood as an effort to promote the equal treatment of creditors. However,
this use is predictable when preference actions are seen as yet another tool
provided to a chapter 11 debtor to promote its own reorganization. If
bankruptcy in chapter 11 is about business preservation, the use or non-use
of preference actions on the basis of relationship status is both reasonable
and expected.
In light of what we know about business relationships and their response
to perceived acts of betrayal, it should not be surprising that companies in
bankruptcy hesitate to bring preference actions against valuable trade
partners, and that they can justify that hesitation as being in the best interests
of the company. As Steward Macaulay observed in his seminal work on the
topic, there is a strong culture in business to avoid legal recourse when at all
possible.215 Macaulay reported one businessman as saying, "You can settle
any dispute if you keep the lawyers and accountants out of it. They just do
not understand the give-and-take needed in business."216 The businessmen in
Macaulay's study were so reluctant to exercise their rights against business
partners that they would forgo legal remedies to which they were entitled.217
This was explained in part by the perception that reliance on such recovery
was unnecessary in light of prevailing non-legal norms and sanctions and that
use of legal remedies could backfire. As Macaulay noted, "[b]oth business
units involved in the exchange desire to continue successfully in business and
will avoid conduct which might interfere with attaining this goal. One is
concerned with both the reaction of the other party in the particular exchange
and with his own general business reputation." 218 The power of reputation,
215. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, AM.
Soc. REv., Feb. 1963, at 55, 58.
216. Id. at 61.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 63.
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Macaulay found, operates very effectively to encourage cooperative
behavior, both in keeping commitments and in avoiding the impression that
one is "inflexible" or too insistent on adhering to precise business terms. 2 19
Businesses may lose future customers by developing a reputation for
unreliability or litigiousness. 22 0 In light of chapter I1's focus on business
reorganization, concerns relative to the business's position and reputation
vis-a-vis its partners is natural.
Furthermore, similar concerns about relationship preservation in
bankruptcy arise in other chapter 11 contexts. For example, the pressure to
retain business relationships with essential trade creditors, combined with the
pressure to mollify these creditors with a credible promise of repayment, has
justified the practice of granting so-called "critical vendor" motions in some
circumstances. 22 1 The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "critical
vendor" nor does it provide any explicit guidance on what action may be
taken to preserve a DIP's relationship with such a creditor. Instead, decisions
about who to submit to the court as a critical vendor are left to the debtor,
with the court typically granting or denying designation on a case-by-case
basis. 2 22 The factors courts consider will vary, but they will typically involve
some evaluation of how necessary a given creditor is and how unlikely it is
that the creditor will continue to do business with the DIP absent such a
designation. 2 23 For creditors who are designated as critical vendors, the DIP
generally moves for the court to permit payment of certain pre-bankruptcy
claims prior to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.224 Courts across
the country have granted such motions, often pursuant to bankruptcy courts'
219. Id. at 64, 66 ("Holding a customer to the letter of a contract is bad for 'customer
relations."').
220. See id. at 61 (quoting one businessman as saying, "if something comes up, you get
the other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don't read legalistic contract
clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he
wants to stay in business because one must behave decently").
221. See Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor
Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REv. 183, 183 (2005).
222. Id. at 184.
223. See, e.g., In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 498-99 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002)
(requiring debtor to demonstrate (1) vendor is "virtually indispensable to profitable operations
or preservation of the estate"; (2) designation would realize "meaningful economic gain" or
avoidance of "serious economic harm"; and (3) there is a lack of "practical alternatives"); In
re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543, 547 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (considering
"[w]hether approval of the borrowing is critical to the future of the business, given the
condition of the business at the time the motion is heard, and given the status of its postpetition financing").
224. See Resnick, supra note 221, at 183.
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ability under § 105 of the Code to "issue any order, process, orjudgment that
is necessary or appropnate to carry out the provisions of this title." 2 25
Critical vendor motions are a topic of controversy within the bankruptcy
field, both in their statutory justification and in their practical
consequences. 226 As such, scholars have paid significant attention to the
legitimacy of their use and the extent to which they impact bankruptcy
proceedings.

2 27

However, until now scholars have not viewed preference

litigation in a similar vein. As demonstrated above, preference actions can be
seen as a counterpoint to critical vendor motions-the stick counterpart to
the critical vendor carrot. Instead of providing an incentive to companies on
the front end of a bankruptcy to continue their interactions with the debtor, it
may be a punishment on the back end. Companies that are not essential, that
resist the debtor's efforts to reorganize, or that might grant other strategic
concessions may be subject to a preference action while others are spared. In
this way, the motivation and use of preference actions in chapter 11 are
analogous to critical vendor motions, and stem from concerns of debtor
survival more than creditor equality or pre-bankruptcy behavior.
Conclusion
On the whole, the data gathered from this limited study of parties involved
in bankruptcy proceedings suggests that preference law in chapter 11 is not
used for the purpose of ensuring equality among creditors. Indeed, preference
225. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018).
226. See, e.g., Joseph Gilday, "Critical"Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 411, 414 (2003) (referring to the practice
of granting critical vendor motions as "unjust, unwise, and illegal"); Robert A. Morris, The
Case Against "Critical Vendor" Motions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2003,
https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/the-case-against-critical-vendor-motions
("For the same
reasons that cause the debtor to have no short-term substitute for the critical supplier, that
same supplier normally has no short-term substitute customer for that inventory and that
production capacity.").
227. See, e.g., Ashley M. McDow & Michael T. Delaney, CriticalVendors- Necessity or
Nullity, 33 CAL. BANKR. J. 25, 25 (2014) (noting debate over the extent to which critical vendor
claims should be permissible under the Bankruptcy Code); Resnick, supra note 221, at 212
("[B]ankruptcy courts should, and likely will, continue the practice of authorizing the payment
of prebankruptcy debt in certain situations."); Elizabeth Shumejda, Critical Vendor Trade
Agreements in Chapter]] Bankruptcy, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 159, 193 (2016) (noting
in a study of chapter 11 cases that nearly three-quarters of the sample had approved critical
vendor motions); Travis N. Turner, Kmart and Beyond: A "Critical" Look and Critical
Vendor Orders and the Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 431, 482 (2006)
(noting the lack of explicit statutory authorization for critical vendor motions, but suggesting
some sources for authority).
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law is instrumental in ensuring that creditors are not treated equally. Instead,
preference actions are used as a strategic tool of the debtor to punish
recalcitrant creditors, to coerce greater cooperation on the threat of a lawsuit,
or to obtain funding for administrative expenses from creditors who will not
be needed as business partners moving forward. Accordingly, this Article
recommends a shift in how preference actions are viewed and discussed in
the chapter 11 context.
For one thing, it is illogical to view preference actions as serving creditors
in chapter 11 proceedings. Rather, they serve the debtor's interest as a DIP.
Although additional data gathering is necessary, the perception is that
preference actions do not actually recover much, especially when one takes
the expense of litigation into account.22 One survey of practitioners
estimated that the percentage of the claim settled for was, on average, 58.5%
of the original amount identified as a preference.229 Many interviewees in this
study reported observing significantly smaller recoveries in their practice, but
there was a wide range of reported amounts, and the facts of the case
mattered. 23 0 Furthermore, the bar has expressed some skepticism that most
228. See McCoid, supra note 43, at 262 ("There is little information regarding the extent
of recapture. The Administrative Office of United States Courts, which annually published
bankruptcy statistics, publishes no figures on this."); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on
H.R. 31, 32, Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary (pt. 1), 94th Cong. 396-97 (1975) (statement of Peter F. Coogan); id at 479-80
(testimony of Patrick A. Murphy); id. (pt. 3) at 1668-70 (1976) (statement of Richard
Kaufman); James Angell McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L.
REV. 233, 235 (1946). The perception among credit providers as reported in a 1997 survey
was that preferences recoveries "never or rarely" increased distributions to unsecured
creditors, although the response from bankruptcy practitioners to the same question reported
that recoveries were frequently significantly increased by preference recoveries. AM. BANKR.
INST. TASK FORCE ON PREFERENCES, PREFERENCE SURVEY REPORT 5 (1997) (Charles J. Tabb,
Reporter).
229. Am. BANKR. INST. TASK FORCE ON PREFERENCES, supra note 228, at 8; see also Email
from Paul Schrader, Fullerton Law, to Brook E. Gotberg (Mar. 26, 2018, 5:14 PM CST) (on
file with the author) ("The take of trustees and counsel from preference recoveries is often in
the 20% - 40% range.").

230. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (referencing choking a $25,000
claimto $10,000); Telephone Interview withDA (June 6, 2017) ("They always settle and they
always settle for 40 to 60 cents [on the dollar]."); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017)
("In the practical scheme of things they'll take fifty cents on the dollar back, sixty cents.");
Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (reporting settlements are 10-20% of what is
owed); Telephone Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (preference claims are settled for 20%
or less of the face value); Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) ("As a rule of thumb
[the settlement] should be less than 10%."); Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017)
("The only thing I guess I would say with certainty is less than half. I've seen as low as 10%
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preference recoveries go to administrative expenses, rather than to repay
creditors.2 31
As demonstrated above, preference proceedings in chapter 11 cases of
reorganization are most likely motivated by a debtor's strategic concerns, and
not by the desire to ensure equal distribution among creditors. Accordingly,
observers should not be surprised by creditors' visceral negative reactions to
the law of preferences. Insofar as preference actions serve a legitimate
purpose in chapter 11 cases, it is to provide the debtor with the flexibility to
manage its business relationships. As one attorney mused, "when all is said
and done, the practice is at least as much about human relationships, trust and
confidence, as it is about the technicalities of the Bankruptcy Code."232
Preference actions in chapter 11 represent a debtor's ability to preserve or
inflict harm on those relationships in order to obtain a desired end; that is, a
successful plan of reorganization.

or less I suppose. It was rare that it was more than 50%."); Telephone Interview with DA
(Aug. 31, 2017) (reporting settlement amount ranges from 25-90% of the claimed amount);
Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (reporting settlement payments of up to 75% on
transfers with no defense, and up to 25% on transfers for which there is a good defense).
231. See, e.g., Thomas D. Goldberg, Curbing Abusive Preference Actions: Rethinking
Claims on Behalf of Administratively Insolvent Estates, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004,
https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/curbing-abusive-preference-actions-rethinking-claims-onbehalf-of-administratively.
232. Telephone Interview withDA (July 17, 2017).
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW GUIDE: CREDITORS
Last Revised 7/11/2017
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Would you tell me a little bit about your business?
-

-

What is the product or service that you produce?
How many employees?
Size in terms of revenues?
Number of offices?
Public or Private?
How long have you been in business in your current market?
What is your position?

2. Can we talk a bit about your relationship with [the debtor] prior to
the debtor's bankruptcy?
-

How long have you done business with [the debtor]?
Who was your primary contact?
How did your relationship with [the debtor] begin?
What good or service did you provide to [the debtor]? OR what
good or service did you receive from [the debtor]?

BANKRUPTCY PROCESS

1. Can you tell me what [the debtor's] bankruptcy was like for you, or
how it affected you or your business?
-

Were you surprised by [the debtor's] decision to file for
bankruptcy?
How did you find out that [the debtor] had filed for bankruptcy?
How did you feel about [the debtor] filing for bankruptcy?
What did you think that would mean for you and your company, if
anything?
Was this your first bankruptcy experience?

2019]

RELATIONAL PREFERENCESIN CHAPTER

10
1063

4. Were you ever contacted by [the debtor's] attorney? If so, can you
tell me more about that experience?
5. Did you ever have cause to hire your own attorney to represent you
in [the debtor's] bankruptcy proceedings? If so, why?
-

How did you feel about the need to involve an attorney?
Did you obtain an outcome you were satisfied with?
If not, what outcome would you have liked to see?

If not, how did you negotiate the process?
-

Did anything surprise you about the bankruptcy? How did you react
to that?

POST-BANKRUPTCY EXPERIENCE
6. After the bankruptcy was over, did your relationship with [the
debtor] change? If so, why, and in what ways?
-

Did the bankruptcy affect the way you viewed [the debtor]?
Did the bankruptcy affect [the debtor's] products or services?

7. Do you still maintain a relationship with [the debtor]?
-

If so, why? If not, why not?
Was this your preferred outcome?
Would you have made the decision to maintain or not maintain the
relationship if the bankruptcy had not happened?

8. Reflecting on the experience as a whole, is there any way in which
the court, the attorney, or [the debtor] could have acted differently to
obtain a better overall outcome?
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE: DEBTORS
Last Revised 2/9/17
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Would you tell me a little bit about your business?
-

-

What is the product or service that you produce?
How many employees?
Size in terms of revenues?
Number of offices?
Public or Private?
How long have you been in business in your current market?

BANKRUPTCY PROCESS

2. What was it like to arrive at the decision to file bankruptcy? How
did the decision come about? Did anything in particular influence your
decision to file for bankruptcy?
-

What did you think bankruptcy would mean for you and your
company?

3. How did you make the decision to bring preference actions against
your creditors?
-

What was the outcome of the preference action?
Was this the outcome you expected?
Were there any unexpected consequences?

4. What was your overall experience with the bankruptcy process?
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POST-BANKRUPTCY EXPERIENCE

5. After the bankruptcy was over, did your business relationships with
your pre-existing creditors (list specific creditors associated with
debtor) change? If so, why, and in what ways?
-

Did the bankruptcy affect your ability to provide products or
services?
Do you feel like the bankruptcy changed others' perception of your
business?
Did you lose any relationships with creditors?

6. Were you happy with the outcome of your bankruptcy?
7. Reflecting on the experience as a whole, is there any way in which
the court, the attorneys, or anyone else could have acted differently to
obtain a better overall outcome?
-

Was there anything about the process that surprised you?
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW GUIDE: ATTORNEYS
Last Revised 7/19/2017
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Would you tell me a little bit about your business?
-

How long have you represented clients involved in bankruptcy?
How often have you been involved in bankruptcy cases?
Do you tend to represent more debtors or creditors, and what is the
percentage?
What size of cases do you generally deal with?

BANKRUPTCY PROCESS

2. Generally speaking, what is the reaction of creditors when they learn
that a business or trade partner has filed for bankruptcy?
-

From the debtor's perspective, what would be the ideal reaction?
From the debtor's perspective, what would the ideal relationship
with creditor's look like during the course of the bankruptcy?

3. How does a bankruptcy filing actually influence the relationship
between debtors and creditors?
4. In your experience, how does the filing of a preference action affect
the relationship between debtors and creditors?
5. What considerations do debtors tend to weigh in determining
whether or not to bring a preference action in a chapter 11?
-

Are there instances in which you had to counsel your client whether
or not to bring a preference action?
What factors came into play in making that decision?
Were you surprised at all with the outcome of that decision? If so,
how?
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6. Do creditors ever see a preference action coming?
-

Are they deterred from collection on the debtor?

7. How are preference actions typically resolved?
-

-

Based on your experience, what percentage of preference actions
brought by the debtor, a liquidating trust, or the chapter 7 trustee
result in settlement? Is there a difference depending on who brings
the action?
For actions that settle, at what point in the proceedings does this
tend to happen?
Based on your experience, what is the typical settlement as a
percentage of the preference claim? Does it depend on certain
factors, and if so, what?

8. (For Debtor's Attorneys) How often do you contact creditors? How
do you perceive your role as counsel to a debtor?
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D

Dear Sir or Madam,
You are being contacted because of your company's involvement in a recent
chapter 11 bankruptcy case,
. I am conducting a research study on the
impact of chapter 11 on relationships between debtors and trade creditors. I hope
you will consider being part of this research study.
Within the next two weeks, I will attempt to contact you by telephone for an
interview. The number I have for you is

.

I am attempting to interview

approximately 15 debtors, 30 creditors, and 15 attorneys who can speak
generally about their about their experience in chapter 11. I expect our discussion
will take about 20 minutes, depending on the length of your responses. I will be
recording the conversation for purposes of accurately capturing the information
you provide. Your responses will be transcribed, but all information provided
will be kept confidential, and your name and personal information will not be
used in any way.
You are under no obligation to participate in the research study, however,
your participation will provide valuable insight into the experience of debtors
and creditors in chapter 11, and how bankruptcy laws might be altered to better
achieve the stated goals of bankruptcy. There are no known risks associated with
participation, and no costs to you. As part of the research study, you will be asked
to recall and describe your experience regarding bankruptcy proceedings that
have taken place within the past five years. Depending on your experience, this
may bring to mind stressful or unpleasant memories. There is no compensation
associated with this study.
Should you have any questions regarding this research study, or if you do
not wish to be contacted, please fill out and return the attached form. You may
also contact me at (573) 882-3914, or at my email address,
gotbergbmissouri.edu. If you have questions regarding your rights as a
subject participant, you may contact the Institutional Review Board for the
University of Missouri at (573) 882-9585. In addition, if there is a number you
would prefer to be contacted at, or a better organizational contact for this
inquiry, please provide the information in the form below.
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Brook Gotberg
Associate Professor
University of Missouri School of Law
203 Hulston Hall, Columbia, MO 65203
(573) 882-3914
szotbe; '&bmissourifedu

